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“Private Property therefore is a Creature of Society, and is 
subject to the Calls of that Society, whenever its Necessities shall 
require it . . . .” 
 Benjamin Franklin1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As with many of the deceptively simple phrases contained in the 
United States Constitution, the final clause of the Fifth Amendment 
contains only a handful of words.  Popularly referred to as the Takings 
Clause, it states that private property shall not be taken for public use 
without just compensation being paid to the owner.2  Nevertheless, 
regardless of its brevity, the Takings Clause has inspired a multitude of 
mystifying legal issues.  Among the legal quandaries stirred by this 
clause is the thorny doctrine of regulatory takings.3  A taking is a 
governmental appropriation of private land, either directly through a 
statute or indirectly through a limiting regulation.4  The latter of these 
methods, termed a regulatory taking, occurs when the government does 
not physically appropriate a particular property interest, but regulates it 
in such a way as to excessively reduce its value.5  However, most often 
the Takings Clause is associated with the government’s power of 
eminent domain.  Eminent domain involves a governmental taking that 
 
 1. FRED R. SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 348 (1993) (quoting 1 The WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 59 (Albert Henry Smyth ed., 1907)).  2. U.S. CONST. art. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).  3. Anthony Saul Alperin, The “Takings” Clause: When Does Regulation “Go 
Too Far”?, 31 SW. U. L. REV. 169, 169 (2002).  4. BRIAN W. BLAESSER ET AL., LAND USE AND THE CONSTITUTION: PRINCIPLES FOR PLANNING PRACTICE § 4.05, at 13 (Brian W. Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).  5. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 550 (2001). 
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results in the acquisition of that property’s title.  The title is gained by 
the payment of an amount determined either through negotiation with 
the landowner or by the fair market value assessed through an objective 
judicial proceeding.6  Eminent domain refers only to the actual physical 
appropriation of property by the government.  The state may achieve this 
type of taking either by acquiring physical possession of the property7 or 
by rendering it economically useless.8  This Comment will not discuss 
the takings issue as it relates to the government’s power of eminent 
domain;9 rather, it will focus on eminent domain’s little brother, the 
regulatory taking.  Unlike eminent domain, a regulatory taking lays no 
formal claim to an owner’s title10 and may only temporarily deprive the 
owner of its beneficial use.11 
In order to determine if a compensable regulatory taking has occurred, 
the courts have traditionally scorned any type of categorical or per se 
rule.12  Instead, courts have favored a multifactor balancing approach that is 
to be applied on a case-by-case basis.  Such a balancing approach often 
involves several factors, none of which has emerged as dispositive.13  
However, settling on this type of test has not alleviated the inherent 
confusion in applying it.  This confusion has been exacerbated by a line 
of United States Supreme Court decisions that have ultimately failed to 
rely on a single “test” for determining when a regulatory taking becomes 
compensable.14  To make matters worse, while none of these tests is 
identical, none of them expressly overrules the others.  As a result, this 
area of the law has continuously suffered dramatic decreases in clarity. 
 
 6. BLAESSER ET AL., supra note 4, at 67.  7. Alperin, supra note 3, at 169; see also BLAESSER ET AL., supra note 4, § 4.05, at 13 (defining “eminent domain” as “the power of government to condemn or take property for public use, an attribute of sovereignty”).  8. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177–78 (1871) (finding a “taking” when a government-authorized dam flooded downstream land with water, thereby rendering the land useless).  9. While eminent domain itself will not be addressed, regulations that resemble eminent domain, in that they deny a property owner nearly all beneficial use of his land, will be discussed.  10. ROGER CLEGG ET AL., REGULATORY TAKINGS: RESTORING PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS 3 (1994) (defining “regulatory takings” as cases in which the government is accused of taking property rights by regulation and not by physical seizure or occupation). 
 11. Id. at 22 (stating that “[p]roperty taken for a short period of time is still taken”).  12. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633–36 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (writing that the Court has chosen to avoid any “set formula” for deciding when compensation is due under the Takings Clause).  13. BLAESSER ET AL., supra note 4, § 6.01, at 68. 
 14. See infra Part II.C.5. 
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This Comment will argue that the three-factor test developed in Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City15 forms the criteria that 
should be relied upon in all future regulatory takings cases.  All 
subsequent tests have added nothing but confusion and inflexibility to an 
already perplexing and hazy area of the law and stand as a trap for 
unwary and uninformed landowners.  While an ad hoc test may lack the 
stability and certainty of a per se rule, it has the advantage of shedding 
light on the sensitive human issues that inevitably arise in most 
regulatory takings cases.  This Comment will argue that if an overregulated 
landowner hopes to secure compensation in the face of powerful 
governmental interests, those human issues must be heard.16 
Part II of this Comment will begin by identifying the traditional ad 
hoc factors developed by the U.S. Supreme Court.  These traditional 
factors form the stepping stones of the Penn Central analysis.  It will 
begin by reviewing Justice Holmes’s opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. 
v. Mahon,17 which marked the birth of the Court’s regulatory takings 
jurisprudence.18  Once this historical foundation is laid, Part II will then 
analyze the Penn Central case, including the development of its three-
factor test and how it resurrected the regulatory takings issue.  Part II 
will then discuss the subsequent takings test established by the Court in 
Agins v. City of Tiburon,19 and will demonstrate how that test amounts to 
little more than an unnecessary and confounding reflection of the Penn 
Central analysis.  Finally, Part II will test the effectiveness of the Penn 
Central analysis by applying it to the controversial area of temporary 
development moratoria. 
Once the temporary moratoria is defined and its significance as a 
regulatory takings device established, Part III will begin by examining 
how the State of California, and particularly the environmentally 
sensitive Lake Tahoe Basin, have dealt with such land use issues.  It will 
 
 15. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).  16. This Comment will not argue that the Penn Central analysis itself adds clarity in terms of predicting the outcome of regulatory takings cases.  If anything, a fact-sensitive analysis serves to cloud the crystal ball and make any sort of forecast difficult.  The main virtue of the Penn Central test is that it affords a plaintiff the opportunity to shine a light on the human side of a takings case.  Under the Penn Central analysis, no longer will a court simply review the metes and bounds of a governmental interest or the mere economic impact on a regulated landowner.  Rather, all of the facts will come into play, including the sometimes powerfully emotional stories of those whose best laid plans for the future have been thwarted by regulation—stories that cry out for justice.  Under a per se rule, such stories never make it into the courtroom.  Thus, stability and certainty must fall to the need for human clarity.  17. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).  18. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 13 (1995) (stating that Pennsylvania Coal is the “original and most-cited Supreme Court decision on regulatory takings”).  19. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
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then examine the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency20 and 
how the plaintiffs’ choice to forego the Penn Central analysis proved to 
be a fatal error.  Finally, Part III will apply the Penn Central test to the 
facts of Tahoe-Sierra in an effort to show that, under such an analysis, a 
different outcome was possible. 
Like the plaintiffs in both Penn Central and Tahoe-Sierra, this 
Comment will not seek to question the legitimacy of the various 
governmental interests sought to be furthered in these cases by land use 
regulation.  Rather, this Comment will argue that by application of the 
Penn Central test, the government may be required to pay just 
compensation to enjoy the furtherance of such interests.  In particular, 
this Comment will show how the Penn Central test may help 
beleaguered landowners succeed where other tests have failed them and 
remind the courts that “a strong public desire to improve the public 
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut 
than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”21 
II.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PENN CENTRAL TEST 
A.  The Stepping Stones to Clarity 
It has been eighty years since Justice Holmes made his famous 
declaration in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon22 that “while property 
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.”23  Regardless of other fluctuations in the law, 
this “too far” test remains the core of the regulatory takings analysis.24  
Nevertheless, since Pennsylvania Coal, regulatory takings jurisprudence 
has evolved significantly.  Courts at every level have developed various 
criteria for determining which regulations may go too far and thereby 
require compensation.25  Such determinations are necessary because, as 
Justice Holmes also pointed out in Pennsylvania Coal, property rights 
“are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police 
 
 20. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 21. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 416. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 415 (emphasis added).  24. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.4, at 529 (3d ed. 2000).  25. For further discussion of the various tests developed at all levels of the court system, see infra text accompanying notes 206–16. 
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power.”26  Echoing this sentiment, the U.S. Supreme Court continues to 
hold that the government need not pay for every regulatory 
deprivation.27  Nevertheless, as Pennsylvania Coal makes clear, this 
qualification itself must have its own limits.28 
Despite Justice Holmes’s efforts, as Justice Scalia pointed out in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council,29 the Pennsylvania Coal decision 
“offered little insight into when, and under what circumstances, a given 
regulation would be seen as going ‘too far’ for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment.”30  In fact, since Pennsylvania Coal, the Court has struggled 
to set workable parameters that may indicate when the government has 
gone “too far.”31  The only consistent holding by the Court is that there 
is no precise formula for determining when a regulation becomes a 
compensable taking.32  Rather, the Court has developed, and continues to 
use, a fact-sensitive approach that involves a number of ad hoc factors, 
under which no single factor is dispositive.33  These factors include the 
following:34 (1) whether the land use regulation furthers a legitimate state 
interest,35 (2) whether the regulation has an adverse economic effect on 
the property with no alternative or offsetting reciprocal benefits,36 (3) 
whether reasonable investments were made prior to general notice of the 
regulatory program,37 and (4) whether the character of the government 
action places a disproportionate burden upon a single landowner when it 
should more properly be borne by the community.38  These factors protect 
landowners by ensuring that land use regulations (1) have constitutional 
legitimacy, (2) leave the property with economic viability, (3) provide 
investment security, and (4) ensure fairness through proportionality.39  
While these factors do not constitute an exhaustive list, they constantly 
reappear and form the basis of nearly all of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
key regulatory takings decisions.40 
 
 26. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.  27. Alperin, supra note 3, at 234. 
 28. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.  29. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 30. Id. at 1015.  31. Alperin, supra note 3, at 170.  32. BLAESSER ET AL., supra note 4, § 6.01, at 68. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. § 6.02, at 70.  35. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).  36. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014–19 (1992).  37. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).  38. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).  39. This Comment will refer to these factors simply as legitimacy, viability, security, and proportionality. 
 40. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633–36 (2001) (utilizing viability and security); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014–19 (utilizing viability); Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (utilizing legitimacy and viability); Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124 (utilizing 
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B.  The Traditional Factors 
Modern regulatory takings law had its genesis in the 1922 case of 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.41  While many accept this case as the 
beginning of the U.S. Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence, 
this was not the first time that Justice Holmes had considered the takings 
issue.42  His experiences on the Massachusetts Supreme Court made him 
aware that if police power was not restrained, private property might 
cease to exist.43  Thus, through Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes 
sought to place some limits on that power.44  After eighty years, the 
basic tenets of the Pennsylvania Coal decision remain unchanged and 
are reflected throughout the subsequently developed Penn Central 
analysis. 
In the deed to the land upon which the Mahons had built their family 
home, there was a clause specifically limiting their ownership to the 
surface estate.45  Both the support and mineral estates were owned by the 
Pennsylvania Coal Company.  The Mahon’s purchased the home 
knowing that the coal company would eventually mine the property and 
that the risk of collapse would require them to vacate.46  The State of 
Pennsylvania became concerned about the cave-in risks and passed the 
Kohler Act,47 which made it unlawful to mine under residential 
 
legitimacy, viability, and security); Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49 (utilizing proportionality).  41. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).  42. GEORGE SKOURAS, TAKINGS LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT: JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF THE REGULATORY STATE’S ACQUISITION, USE, AND CONTROL OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 29–30 (1998).  Justice Holmes had considered the issue of regulatory takings as early as his time spent on the Massachusetts Supreme Court.  Id. 
 43. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.  “When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappears.”  Id.; see also SKOURAS, supra note 42, at 29–30.  44. Some commentators believe that Pennsylvania Coal was to property and takings law what Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), was to judicial review.  SKOURAS, supra note 42, at 29–30.  The opinion has been cited no less than 100,000 times in the past eighty years.  Id.  There are even those commentators who believe that Holmes rewrote the Constitution in Pennsylvania Coal.  Id. at 30.  45. SKOURAS, supra note 42, at 30.  Under Pennsylvania law at the time, there were three different and separate estates: surface, support, and mineral.  Alperin, supra note 3, at 175. 
 46. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 412.  Because it normally took many years for the coal company to start such mining operations, the Mahons and their ancestors could have enjoyed the property for quite some time undisturbed. SKOURAS, supra note 42, at 30.  47. The statute forbade: the mining of anthracite coal in such a way as to cause the subsidence of, 
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areas.48  The Act deprived the coal company of its ability to mine under 
the Mahon’s home.  As a result, the coal company challenged the 
constitutionality of the Act.  Although the issues in the case were framed 
in terms of due process violations and interference with a contract, the 
coal company was in essence arguing that the government had taken its 
property without just compensation.49  Justice Holmes agreed with the 
coal company.  In finding that a compensable taking had occurred, he 
put into words the foundation of what would later become the Penn 
Central analysis. 
The first factor established by Pennsylvania Coal was that such 
regulations must have constitutional legitimacy.  Justice Holmes 
crystallized the legitimacy factor in two ways.  First, he used the strength 
of the state’s interest as a reference point against which to weigh the 
degree of interference with the property.50  On this point, Justice Holmes 
found that the extent of the public interest was limited because it did not 
apply to those homeowners who also owned the structural and mineral 
estates.51  Also, such a statute was not justified under the heading of 
personal safety because that goal could have been reached by giving 
public notice of the risk.52  Thus, the public interest was weak as 
opposed to the extent of the taking, which was great.53  Secondly, 
Holmes recognized that even if a legitimate state interest did exist and 
would warrant the exercise of eminent domain, it could not be justified 
as a regulatory taking without compensation.54 
 
among other things, any structure used as a human habitation, with certain exceptions, including among them land where the surface is owned by the owner of the underlying coal and is distant more than one hundred and fifty feet from any improved property belonging to any other person. 
Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 412–13.  48. Because the deed conveying the surface estate expressly reserved the coal company’s right to mine all the coal underneath it, the grantees can be assumed to have known that eventually they would be forced to vacate their home.  The deed also released the coal company from any liability for damages that may have arisen from mining the coal.  Id. at 412; see also SKOURAS, supra note 42, at 30 (noting that “[i]t can be assumed that the Mahon’s or their ancestors contracted to buy the house, knowing full well that they were only buying the surface estate”).  Justice Holmes criticized such a purchase as “short sighted.”  Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415–16.  49. SKOURAS, supra note 42, at 31. 
 50. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413–14. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  Justice Holmes relied on the fact that this case involved a single private house, and even though the public interest could have reached that far, in ordinary private affairs it did not warrant the extent of interference that occurred in the case.  Id. at 414.  Therefore, Justice Holmes concluded that the statute did “not disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant’s constitutionally protected rights.”  Id. 
 54. Id. at 415–16. 
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The second factor established by Pennsylvania Coal was the protection 
of the property’s economic viability.  In weighing the extent of the 
interference against the state interest, Justice Holmes concluded that the 
entire economic viability of the coal company’s property right had been 
extinguished by the act.55  In making this evaluation, Holmes cited as a 
factor the extent of the diminution in value.56  When such a diminution 
in value reaches a “certain magnitude,” the regulation becomes an 
“exercise of eminent domain” that requires “compensation to sustain the 
act.”57  On this point, Holmes determined that the act rendered the 
property right worthless because, “[f]or practical purposes, the right to 
coal consists in the right to mine it.”58  In addition, Holmes stated that 
“[w]hat makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised 
with profit” and that “[t]o make it commercially impracticable to mine 
certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes 
as appropriating or destroying it.”59  In other words, by eliminating the 
entire economic value of the property right, the government had, in 
essence, exercised its powers of eminent domain.  As an act of eminent 
domain, compensation was required.60 
The third factor established by Pennsylvania Coal was the interest 
landowners have in the security of their investment.  In his opinion, 
Justice Holmes focused on the fact that the Mahons could not possibly 
have relied on their ability to live on their land indefinitely, because it 
was clearly a part of the deed that the coal company would eventually 
exercise its right to mine the support estate.61  On this point, Justice 
Holmes stated that the risk taken by the Mahons in only acquiring the 
surface estate was not sufficient to warrant interference with the coal 
company’s property rights; in essence, it would be giving the Mahons 
“greater rights than they bought.”62 
 
 55. Id. at 414. 
 56. Id. at 413. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 414 (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Keator v. Clearview Coal Co., 100 A. 820, 820 (Pa. 1917)) (alteration in original). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 413 (stating that “[w]hen it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act”). 
 61. Id. at 415.  Once again, Justice Holmes even went so far as to criticize them for being “short sighted” by only acquiring the surface rights without the right of support and suggested that such short sightedness might prevent a landowner from securing compensation under different circumstances.  Id. 
 62. Id. at 416. 
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The final factor that Pennsylvania Coal established was the necessity 
of fairness through proportionality.  On this point, Holmes stated that in 
exceptional cases involving the “blowing up of a house to stop a 
conflagration” there may be no need for compensation because, in 
general, it was not plain that “a man’s misfortunes or necessities will 
justify his shifting the damages to his neighbor’s shoulders.”63  
However, under the facts of Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes found 
that the city sought to take an unfair shortcut by not paying for the 
improved public condition. 
In the end, Justice Holmes stated that issues regarding regulatory 
takings could not be disposed of by “general propositions” or per se 
rules.64  In fact, the regulation in Pennsylvania Coal had gone beyond 
any of the cases previously decided by the Court in formulating a fact-
sensitive takings analysis.65  Justice Holmes’s opinion in Pennsylvania Coal 
marked the birth of the regulatory takings issue in American courts.66  It 
is critical to note that, from the beginning, the core factors of legitimacy, 
viability, security, and proportionality formed the basis of regulatory 
takings analysis.  Indeed, Pennsylvania Coal provided a strong base for 
the future refinement and adaptation of these factors. 
C.  The Revitalization of Takings Jurisprudence 
While Pennsylvania Coal stands for the general proposition that the 
government can “go too far” with land use regulation, the case did not 
set out a concrete test for determining when the government crosses that 
line.  Despite his efforts to create a conceptual framework for dealing 
with such issues, Justice Holmes’s “balancing of interests” approach 
could not match the ever-growing complexity of the regulatory takings 
problem.67  As George Skouras points out, because Holmes’s test lacked 
“precision and rigor,” it became too open-ended and susceptible to 
unpredictable interpretations.68  As a result, beyond establishing the core 
factors, Pennsylvania Coal provided almost no solid direction to courts 
as to how such factors should be applied to future regulatory takings 
claims.69 
Despite this confusion and uncertainty in the law, soon after 
Pennsylvania Coal, the U.S. Supreme Court began to ignore land takings 
 
 63. Id. at 415–16. 
 64. Id. at 416. 
 65. Id.  66. Alperin, supra note 3, at 170, 174.  67. SKOURAS, supra note 42, at 39. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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cases.70  In fact, it would be nearly fifty years before the Court would 
once again make an attempt to determine when land use measures had 
gone too far.  However, beginning with Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. New York City,71 the Court would begin to revisit the constitutional 
implications of such land use issues.  Many accept Penn Central as the 
most important regulatory takings opinion ever handed down by the 
Supreme Court.72  In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan confirmed 
that confusion had saturated this area of the law and admitted that the 
Court “quite simply, has been unable to develop any ‘set formula’ for 
determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries 
caused by public action be compensated.”73 
The Penn Central decision marks the Supreme Court’s best attempt to 
devise a consistent and workable set of factors for determining when a 
regulatory taking becomes compensable in the modern era.74  In 1967, 
the Grand Central Terminal in New York City was designated a historic 
landmark pursuant to the city’s preservation law.75  In 1968, the plaintiffs 
proposed construction of an office tower that would soar fifty-five 
stories above the station.76  Relying on the fact that their tower would be 
consistent with most other such developments in the terminal’s vicinity, 
the plaintiffs sought permission from the Landmarks Preservation 
Commission of New York City to begin construction.77  The commission 
denied the plan because it concluded that such a structure would be 
incompatible with the historic and visual tone of the existing building.78  
As a result, the plaintiffs filed suit against the city, complaining that the 
preservation law, when applied to their property, amounted to a taking 
without compensation.79  While conceding that what defines a compensable 
regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment had proven to be a 
 
 70. Id. at 40.  71. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 72. See, e.g., ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS 
ON LAND-USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 130 (1999). 
 73. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124.  74. Alperin, supra note 3, at 176. 
 75. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 115–16. 
 76. Id. at 116. 
 77. Id.; see also MELTZ ET AL., supra note 72, at 561 (noting that the terminal owners sought permission to build the tower atop the terminal “in keeping with similar properties in the area”). 
 78. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 117–18. 
 79. Id. at 119. 
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problem of “considerable difficultly,”80 the Supreme Court disagreed 
with the plaintiffs and held that compensation was not required.81 
In Penn Central, the plaintiffs did not seek judicial review of the denials 
directly, but rather brought suit seeking damages for a “temporary 
taking” of their property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.82  The 
plaintiffs did not challenge the preservation of historical landmarks as a 
legitimate governmental interest or the means by which the city sought 
to vindicate its goals.83  Instead, the plaintiffs claimed that the preservation 
laws deprived them of their property’s value, for which they were 
entitled to compensation under the Constitution.84  Essentially, they urged 
that “any substantial restriction imposed pursuant to a landmark law 
must be accompanied by just compensation if it is to be constitutional.”85 
1.  Legitimacy and Beyond 
The first factor considered by the Court in Penn Central was the 
legitimacy of the state interest.  Concerning legitimacy, the Court stated 
that a measure that is not “reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a 
substantial public purpose” or that inflicts a disproportionately ruthless 
effect on the owner may qualify as a compensable taking.86  The Court 
then echoed the owner’s concession that preserving structures and areas 
with special historic, architectural, or cultural significance is a permissible 
and legitimate public purpose.87  However, beyond this, the Court established 
three factors that are of “particular significance” when conducting the 
“essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries” involved in such a takings case.88  
These factors find their foundation in the “Holmsian balancing test 
universe”89 established in Pennsylvania Coal.  However, they went a 
critical step further by specifically enumerating the fundamental points 
in the ad hoc inquiry.  These three factors are (1) the economic impact of 
the regulation on the claimant, (2) the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations, and (3) the 
character of the governmental action.90  While the Court in Penn Central 
did not indicate that these factors compose an exclusive list, it has not 
 
 80. Id. at 123. 
 81. Id. at 138. 
 82. Id. at 119. 
 83. Id. at 129. 
 84. Id. at 119. 
 85. Id. at 129. 
 86. Id. at 127. 
 87. Id. at 108. 
 88. Id. at 124 (emphasis added).  89. SKOURAS, supra note 42, at 52.  90. Note that these factors correspond to what this Comment has dubbed (1) viability, (2) security, and (3) proportionality.  See supra note 39. 
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expanded on them in any meaningful way since.91  Also, throughout the 
decades following the decision, state and federal courts continue to use 
the Penn Central three-pronged test as binding precedent.92 
2.  Viability 
The first factor to be considered under the Penn Central “multi-factor 
balancing test”93 seeks to protect economic viability by assessing a 
regulation’s impact on the property’s value.94  Some consider this to be 
the most significant of the three Penn Central factors.95  However, 
absent a “total taking” that resembles the exercise of eminent domain or 
condemnation, this factor is not dispositive.96  It has been suggested that 
the viability analysis may be broken into three areas of impact: (1) the 
rate of reasonable return, (2) the economic uses of the property, and (3) 
fair market value.97 
Penn Central itself stands as an illustration of the “reasonable-return” 
rule.98  The Court in Penn Central found that the plaintiffs were not 
prevented from continued operation of their already profitable railroad, 
office space, and concession business at the terminal.  Rather, they could 
expect to see a reasonable economic return from these investments.  
Such economic return was found by the Court to be the owner’s true 
expectancy.99 
A near unanimous sentiment in the area of regulatory takings law is 
that a per se taking has occurred only when a regulation extinguishes all 
beneficial uses of property.100  This plays a crucial role in evaluating a 
regulation’s impact on economic use.  From this idea flows the conclusion 
that a categorical taking has not occurred if only the most profitable use 
 
 91. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 72, at 132. 
 92. Id.  93. SKOURAS, supra note 42, at 52.  94. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).  95. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 72, at 132. 
 96. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 490 (1987) (holding that land use regulation is not the same as a physical appropriation, which invariably requires compensation); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (holding that a seventy-five percent diminution is not dispositive); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915) (holding that a 92.5% diminution is not dispositive).  97. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 72, at 132. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 136.  100. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 72, at 132. 
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is restricted.101  Furthermore, barring a physical taking, future profits 
have been held too speculative for the Court to forecast and thus cannot 
be “taken” through regulation.102 
Regulations that cause a property’s fair market value to drop tend to 
implicate a more “fluid concept.”103  In Penn Central, Justice Brennan noted that the Court’s past decisions had “uniformly reject[ed] the 
proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can 
establish a ‘taking.’”104  In fact, both the U.S. Supreme Court and lower 
courts have traditionally held that even regulatory measures that force a 
significant drop in a property’s fair market value do not always create a 
compensable taking.105  However, when put in combination with the 
other two economic impact factors, this element may tip the scales in 
favor of a compensable taking.  Subsequent cases may indicate that this 
judicial view is changing.106 
3.  Security 
The second factor to be considered under the Penn Central test 
protects the interests that landowners have in the security of their 
investments.  Under the Penn Central analysis, the degree to which a 
regulatory measure disrupts a landowner’s “distinct investment-backed 
expectations” is a significant factor in evaluating the takings claim.107  
Nevertheless, the meaning of this factor continues to befuddle judges at 
all levels, causing federal and state courts to divide on its application.  
This confusion had made this factor’s role in the takings analysis a 
puzzle.108  In the more than twenty years since Penn Central, courts and 
commentators alike have been unable to agree on its meaning or 
application.109  A description of this factor, how it has evolved, and its 
 
 101. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). 
 102. Id.  103. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 72, at 133. 
 104. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 131. 
 105. See id.; see also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405, 412 (1915) (holding that a 92.5% reduction is not a taking); Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1031 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that an eighty-nine percent reduction is not a taking); William C. Haas & Co. v. City of San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that a ninety-five percent reduction is not a taking). 
 106. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019–20 (1992) (holding that when a regulation extinguishes the entire economic viability of property, a compensable taking has occurred per se). 
 107. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124.  108. Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Takings Law, in TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN 
AND LUCAS 119, 119 (David L. Callies ed., 1996).  109. R.S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations in 
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application to the Penn Central decision is necessary to better 
comprehend the intricacies of the regulatory takings question. 
Consideration of a property owner’s investment-backed expectations 
was first proposed as a factor to be considered in the regulatory takings 
analysis by Professor Frank I. Michelman.  In a seminal article penned in 
1967,110 Professor Michelman’s takings test focused on the type of 
interest adversely affected by a given regulation, as opposed to the mere 
extent of purely economic impact.111  In describing his test, Professor 
Michelman stated that “the test . . . does not ask ‘how much,’ but    
rather . . . asks ‘whether or not’: whether or not the measure in 
question can easily be seen to have practically deprived the claimant of 
some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed 
expectation.”112 
Professor Michelman’s test found its roots in the utilitarian tradition of 
Jeremy Bentham.113  According to this view, placing an emphasis on an 
owner’s expectations is necessary to encourage efficient investments in 
property.  By encouraging such investments, property will be put to its 
most productive use, which benefits society as a whole.114  However, 
beyond the utilitarian model, Professor Michelman argued that fairness 
is at the center of the takings problem.115  In making this argument, 
Professor Michelman defined the concept of property as “people’s 
reasonable expectations about what rights attach to property by virtue of 
ownership.”116  Nevertheless, even if some of these expectations are 
frustrated by regulation, property owners will still accept them as fair to 
the extent that all are treated equally, or as long as society, as a whole, 
will benefit more from the regulation than without it.117 
In Penn Central, Justice Brennan referred to Michelman’s article118 
 
Regulatory Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 449, 449 (2001).  110. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).  111. Radford & Breemer, supra note 109, at 453.  112. Michelman, supra note 110, at 1233. 
 113. Id. at 1211–13.  114. Radford & Breemer, supra note 109, at 453 (citing Michelman, supra note 110, at 1211–13).  115. Margaret V. Lang, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City: Fairness 
and Accommodation Show the Way Out of the Takings Corner, in REGULATORY TAKING: THE LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROLS 45, 49–50 (G. Richard Hill ed., 1990). 
 116. Id. at 50 (citing Michelman, supra note 110, at 1211–12). 
 117. Id.  118. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 128 (1978). 
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but ultimately failed either to define what is meant by “distinct 
investment-backed expectations”119 or to fully address the fairness 
issue.120  Rather, Justice Brennan cited Justice Holmes from Pennsylvania 
Coal to support the limited proposition that a compensable taking will 
occur if a regulation has “nearly the same effect as the complete 
destruction of [the property] rights.”121  Furthermore, Justice Brennan 
recognized that governmental regulations that upset a property owner’s 
ability to use land for a “specific, clearly anticipated purpose”122 may 
amount to a taking even though such a restriction also substantially 
furthers a valid public interest.123  Thus, Justice Brennan chose to define 
property as Michelman had, as a “set of expectations.”124  However, 
Justice Brennan’s opinion must also stand for the proposition that “if a 
regulation completely destroys the value of an interest in which a 
property owner has no reasonable expectation, there is no taking.”125  
Justice Brennan acknowledged the plaintiffs’ interest in the continued 
use of the terminal, but did not address what other reasonable 
expectations may have been unfairly trampled on by the preservations 
law.126  Commentators suggest that the Penn Central Court’s application 
of the preservation law failed to comport with Professor Michelman’s 
fairness test in two other ways: The terminal owners were being treated 
unequally without any reciprocal benefit, and they were forced to 
provide a benefit for the public at their own expense, when such a cost 
should have been borne by the public as a whole.127 
In essence, the Penn Central decision confronts the propriety of the 
state’s forcing citizens to act in a way that is not in line with the citizens’ 
expected best interests.128  Justice Brennan’s holding may be summarized 
as stating that if a buyer knows or has reason to know prior to purchase 
that the property may be subject to regulations that could potentially 
thwart development, the buyer should have no recourse when the state so 
regulates its use.129  Conversely, if an investor has no reason to believe 
that the property being acquired may be so regulated, then the state 
 
 119. Radford & Breemer, supra note 109, at 455.  120. Lang, supra note 115, at 50. 
 121. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 127.  122. Radford & Breemer, supra note 109, at 456. 
 123. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 127 (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)). For this proposition, Justice Brennan stated that “a state statute that substantially furthers important public policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a ‘taking.’”  Id.  124. Lang, supra note 115, at 50. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 50–51. 
 127. Id. at 52.  128. SKOURAS, supra note 42, at 53. 
 129. Id. at 53–54. 
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should compensate the owner for such a restriction.130  While this may be a 
viable interpretation, Justice Brennan quickly qualified the doctrine:131 
“[T]he submission that appellants may establish a ‘taking’ simply by 
showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit a property 
interest that they heretofore had believed was available for development is 
quite simply untenable.”132  He then went on to cite several cases in 
which the Court had held that a compensable taking had not occurred 
despite the thwarting of investment-backed expectations.133  Some have 
argued that this doctrine reflects Professor Michelman’s apparent 
distinction between regulatory interferences with interests based on mere 
speculation, which are not entitled to compensation if they fail to come 
to fruition, and finely crystallized investments which require 
compensation.134  While this formulation seems to comport with basic 
notions of fairness, it does not flow naturally from a doctrine based on 
expectations which inevitably involve a landowner’s future plans.135  In 
the end, this holding stands for the idea that a subjective intent to use 
property in a certain way is not enough, by itself, to support a 
compensable takings claim.136 
In response to the plaintiffs’ argument that the Penn Central holding 
took their right to erect a structure in the airspace above the terminal, 
Justice Brennan found that “‘taking[s]’ jurisprudence does not divide a 
single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether 
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated.”137  Thus, he 
refused to extend the expectations factor to a divisible property interest 
that was, like the property in Pennsylvania Coal, unprotected by formal 
reservation.138  This “whole property” rule stands for the proposition that 
courts need not protect each and every twig in the property owner’s 
bundle of rights.139  Justice Brennan would eventually use this new 
analytical framework to hold that a compensable taking had not occurred 
in this case.  Despite the fact that the plaintiffs had entered into a lease 
 
 130. Id. at 53.  131. Radford & Breemer, supra note 109, at 456.  132. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978). 
 133. See id. at 130 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 102 (1909)).  134. Radford & Breemer, supra note 109, at 456 n.43. 
 135. Id.  136. Mandelker, supra note 108, at 121. 
 137. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 130.  138. Mandelker, supra note 108, at 120. 
 139. Id. 
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worth millions of dollars based on the expected erection of the office 
building,140 had most likely spent considerable time and expense on 
producing architectural plans to carry out the expected construction,141 
and had even showed that the terminal had been originally designed in 
contemplation of such a structure,142 the Court still refused to find a 
compensable taking.  One commentator notes that “[i]t is hard to imagine a 
more ‘distinct investment-backed expectation.’”143  Nevertheless, Justice 
Brennan balanced these considerations against a finding that the terminal 
owner’s expectation of development had not been totally destroyed.144  
In fact, while the commission had rejected proposals for two much larger 
buildings (fifty-five- and fifty-three-story towers), the commission gave 
no indication of an intention to prohibit any and all construction above 
the terminal.145  The record did not foreclose the possibility that a 
structure more in line with the terminal’s originally anticipated design (a 
twenty-story tower) might have been approved.146  Furthermore, the 
terminal owners had available transferable development rights (TDRs), 
which would have allowed for construction above any one of eight other 
properties in the same area, all of which were owned by the plaintiffs. 147 
As mentioned above, Justice Brennan found that no compensable 
taking had occurred because the preservation law did not disrupt the 
plaintiffs’ “primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel” as a 
railroad station.148  However, this calls into doubt whether a landowner 
has a right to claim that his investment-backed expectations have been 
hampered if a regulation does in fact interfere with such primary 
expectations.149  If so, then a landowner’s subjective intentions as to 
what her primary expectations are may creep back into the analysis.150 
In what may have been a response to the confusion over whether 
investment-backed expectations are to be judged by a subjective or 
objective standard, the Court in Kaiser Aetna v. United States151 slightly 
 
 140. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 116. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id.  143. William K. Jones, Confiscation: A Rationale of the Law of Takings, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 50 (1995).  144. Radford & Breemer, supra note 109, at 457. 
 145. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 115–17, 136–37.  146. Radford & Breemer, supra note 109, at 457–58 (citing Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 137 n.34).  147. The Court’s mention of TDRs was not explicitly linked to the fairness issue.  However, such a give-and-take consideration may fulfill Professor Michelman’s avowal on fairness as a factor in the takings analysis.  Lang, supra note 115, at 52–53. 
 148. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 136.  149. Mandelker, supra note 108, at 121. 
 150. Id.  151. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
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altered the expectations analysis by replacing the term “distinct” with 
“reasonable.”  Based on Aetna’s formulation of the Penn Central factors, 
the Court has since sought to give security only to a landowner’s 
“reasonable investment backed expectations.”152  Unfortunately, this 
shift makes it more difficult for a landowner to prevail on a regulatory 
takings claim and continues to represent a significant degradation from 
the fairness model advocated by Professor Michelman.153  While once 
forced to examine the “impact of governmental restrictions in 
foreclosing distinctly identifiable planned uses of land,”154  by shifting to 
an objective standard, courts may be prone to substituting their own 
subjective assessments as to whether a claimant’s expectations are 
reasonable.  Ultimately, as one commentator has put it, “[w]hile 
‘expectations’ seem personal and subjective, ‘reasonableness’ seems 
rooted in the context of societal interaction and objective.  In short, 
reasonable expectations are shaped by law—or shape the law.”155  What 
is reasonable in a particular judge’s mind may operate as a hidden per se 
rule vitiating the critical fact-sensitive inquiry crucial to the Penn 
Central analysis. 
Economists state that a “reasonableness” or “good faith” element of 
investment-backed expectations is necessary for takings compensation to 
be efficient.156  They argue that there are two types of investors in the 
takings context: those who can demonstrate a bona fide intention to 
develop the property and would suffer a “true loss” from government 
regulation, and those who never truly intended to make such investments 
in development but who merely claim such an intention in an effort to be 
compensated for the taking.157  These economists assert that the purpose 
of inserting a reasonableness factor into the investment-backed expectations 
analysis is to distinguish between these two types of investors.158  
Economists deem inefficient a system that grants compensation to all 
 
 152. Id. at 175 (emphasis added).  153. Radford & Breemer, supra note 109, at 460. 
 154. Id. at 460–61 (citing Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 787 P.2d 907, 915 n.29 (Wash. 1990)) (holding that “distinct” means that the “expectation must have some concrete manifestation,” whereas “reasonable” means only that the expectation “must be appropriate under the circumstances”).  155. Steven J. Eagle, The Rise and Rise of “Investment-Backed Expectations,” 32 URB. LAW. 437, 442 (2000).  156. THOMAS J. MICELI & KATHLEEN SEGERSON, COMPENSATION FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS WITH APPLICATIONS 108 (1996). 
 157. Id. at 107. 
 158. Id. 
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who make reliance expenditures, regardless of their reasonableness, but 
automatically denies compensation to those who make no expenditures 
at all.159  Compensation rules should create an incentive for landowners 
to make expenditures in reliance on expected development only if it is 
efficient to do so.160  A bare investment-backed expectations compensation 
rule will not ensure such an incentive.  This is because some landowners 
will be induced to make inefficient investments based solely on a 
perverse incentive to be compensated in the event of regulation and not 
for the improvement or best use of the property.161  Thus, a rule that 
affords compensation based only on the fact that a landowner has 
incurred reliance expenditures often leads to overinvestment.162 
As Thomas J. Miceli and Kathleen Segerson point out, economists 
recognize that if the law reads a “reasonableness” or “good faith” factor 
into the investment-backed expectations analysis, such expenditures will 
most likely be efficient.163  A rule that combines reliance with an 
element of reasonableness forces the courts to ensure that expenditures 
are made in good faith and in order to put the property to its most 
efficient economic use.164  Under such a rule, those who make no 
reliance expenditures will receive no compensation for development 
prohibitions, while landowners who make such investments will receive 
compensation equal to their loss “if and only if” their investments are 
reasonable, or in economic terms, efficient.165 
Bearing on the subject of reasonableness, the issue of notice is an 
important component of protecting the security of investment-backed 
expectations.  Though not specifically considered in Penn Central, this 
factor is critical to the reasonableness analysis.  In Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co.,166 a federal environmental statute allowed agencies to 
disclose data otherwise protected by trade secret law that was obtained 
while reviewing applications for pesticide registration.167  While confirming 
that the Fifth Amendment protects trade secrets as property, the Court 
held that the takings claim lacked the necessary “force” of investment-
backed expectations required to prevail.168  Because the statute informed 
Monsanto in advance that by filing an application it agreed to the 
disclosure of trade secrets, the Court held that Monsanto’s investment-
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 107–08. 
 162. Id. at 108. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 114.  166. 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
 167. Id. at 993.  168. Mandelker, supra note 108, at 122. 
LARKIN.DOC 9/24/2019  4:12 PM 
[VOL. 40:  1597, 2003]  Dramatic Decreases in Clarity 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1617 
backed expectations could not have been reasonable.169 
According to Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion, the statute put 
Monsanto on notice as to how the EPA was allowed to use and disclose 
data.170  The Court found that Monsanto was cognizant of the consequences 
involved in submitting the application, that those conditions were 
rationally related to a legitimate public interest, and that Monsanto had  
voluntarily submitted the application in return for an economic 
advantage.171  Thus, Ruckelshaus mixes in an important qualification to 
the investment-backed expectations analysis: that notice of a 
governmental regulation may limit the force of a landowner’s reliance 
expenditures.172 
More importantly, however, the Court held that Monsanto had no 
reasonable expectation of nondisclosure even if the regulations were not 
yet in effect.  The Court found that the pesticide industry had long been 
the focus of public concern and heavy governmental regulation.  Based 
on this fact, Monsanto was put on constructive notice that disclosure of 
health, safety, and environmental data concerning pesticides could 
become statutorily required as substantially furthering a public 
interest.173  Thus, a general regulatory scheme that should cause 
reasonable landowners to anticipate future regulation may serve as 
constructive notice, making reliance expenditures unreasonable.174  
Under such circumstances, constructive notice could be used to cripple any 
regulatory takings claim.  In the end, while Ruckelshaus’s constructive 
notice rule would be called into question by the Court a mere three years 
later,175 many lower courts persist in holding that a landowner’s 
expectations cannot be reasonable if they come in conflict with the 
government’s reasonably foreseeable regulatory authority.176 
Reasonable investment-backed expectations play an important role in any 
regulatory takings analysis.177  However, despite its critical importance, 
the Supreme Court has done little to clarify what the term actually 
 
 169. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 987. 
 170. Id. at 1008.  171. Mandelker, supra note 108, at 122. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1008.  174. Radford & Breemer, supra note 109, at 464. 
 175. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987).  176. Radford & Breemer, supra note 109, at 469 (citing Parkridge Investors Ltd. P’ship v. Farmers Home Admin., 13 F.3d 1192, 1199 (8th Cir. 1994); Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 321 (1991)).  177. Mandelker, supra note 108, at 138. 
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means.178  This has caused inevitable and sometimes hopeless confusion 
in the lower courts and has resulted in some abandoning this prong of 
the takings analysis completely.179  These courts look beyond the 
balancing approach to investment-backed expectations set out in Penn 
Central and hold that such expectations are frustrated only when a 
regulation destroys all economically viable use of the land.180  By doing 
so, courts effectively eliminate the ingredient of fairness that Professor 
Michelman argued for and which has been judicially espoused through 
the Penn Central analysis. 
The Supreme Court should seek to resolve the confusion that hampers 
the use of investment-backed expectations as a factor in the regulatory 
takings analysis.  As Daniel R. Mandelker suggests, this may be 
accomplished by linking the recognition of landowner expectations to 
the amount of risk involved in entering particular property markets.181  A 
market that is full of regulatory uncertainty may require that landowner 
expectations be ignored, while markets that have seen little and have low 
potential for regulation may require that such expectations be 
recognized.182  The key is a case-by-case analysis which affords courts an 
opportunity to determine what is fair and just under the circumstances. 
4.  Proportionality 
The character of the government action plays a role in determining 
proper proportionality by ensuring that the burdens imposed on a 
landowner are either offset by reciprocal benefits as mandated by 
Pennsylvania Coal,183 or that landowners are left with enough of an 
interest in the property to defeat claims of eminent domain.184  This 
factor is viewed as the most straightforward of the three Penn Central 
factors.185  Obviously, a taking is much more likely to be held 
disproportionate and compensable if the government effects an actual 
 
 178. Id. at 138–39. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 139. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See supra Part II.B.  184. While Justice Brennan never explicitly links proportionality to his “character of the government action” factor, it is fair to assume that proportionality was part of his analysis.  By determining the character of a given governmental action as a threshold issue, courts can determine whether the proportionality question should even be reached.  If a taking may be categorized as categorical, then compensation is due under a per se rule.  However, if something less than a categorical or physical taking has occurred, the fairness analysis must be conducted as part of the Penn Central test.  Thus, it is this Comment’s assertion that the character of the government action and proportionality are inexorably linked.    185. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 72, at 135. 
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physical occupation of private property rather than mere regulation of its 
use.186  In such cases, compensation is almost always required, regardless 
of the state’s interest in the regulation or the economic impact on the 
owner.187  Nevertheless, even actions that are solely regulatory in nature 
have a hierarchy of deference when they come under a takings analysis.188  
Regulations that interfere with a property owner’s right to devise 
property189 or a landowner’s right to exclude the public190 raise particular 
constitutional doubt.191  The same can be said for regulations meant to 
preserve private lands as open space in order to benefit the public.192  On 
the other hand, government regulations aimed at abating nuisances are 
more likely to survive under a proportionality analysis.193  Of course, 
problems arise with those regulations that fall in the middle of the two 
extremes.  When analyzing these types of cases, economic impact and 
investment-backed expectations play a more significant role.194 
In attempting to determine the nature of the government action and 
proportionality, it is important to recognize that there need not be 
complete parity between benefits and burdens.  The mere disparity of 
economic impact is not enough to make a taking compensable.195  Land 
use regulations “designed to promote the general welfare commonly 
 
 186. Id. at 135–36.  187. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434–35 (1982) (reiterating that when the character of the governmental action is a “permanent physical occupation,” the Court has “uniformly . . . found a taking . . . without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner”). 
 188. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,  135–36 (1978). 
 189. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716–18 (1987) (holding that regulations that totally abrogate the right to devise cannot be constitutionally upheld); see also Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 244–45 (1992) (upholding the decision in Irving while focusing on the “‘extraordinary’ character of the governmental regulation” in that it “severely restricts the right of an individual to direct the descent of his property”). 
 190. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831–32 (1987) (holding that interference with the right to exclude amounts to a “permanent physical occupation” of land, which always requires compensation regardless of the state interest furthered by the regulation); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979) (holding that the right to exclude others is fundamental and “falls within [the] category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation”).   191. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 72, at 136. 
 192. Id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024–25 (1992)). 
 193. Id. (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (holding that a regulation prohibiting mining that caused subsidence damage to structures on the surface was not a taking)).  194. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 72, at 136.  195. Alperin, supra note 3, at 182. 
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burden[] some more than others.”196  Nevertheless, these burdens and 
benefits may still be reciprocal if an owner who is burdened by one 
regulation, albeit more heavily than other groups, benefits from 
restrictions imposed on other people’s property.197 
5.  If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It 
If the U.S. Supreme Court had simply ended its takings test 
formulation with Penn Central, the law would not be in the confused 
state it is today.198  However, a mere two years after the Penn Central 
decision, the Court announced, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,199 a different 
test, focusing the constitutional inquiry solely on protecting a landowner’s 
interest in economic viability and the legitimacy of the state interest.  It 
did so by requiring such land use regulations to substantially advance 
valid state interests and not deprive a landowner of all economically 
viable use of his property.200  Under this two-part test, if either prong is 
violated, a compensable taking has usually occurred.201 
However, it is questionable at best as to whether the two-prong test of 
Agins really adds anything to the analysis already set down in Penn 
Central.  Before even reaching its trilogy of factors, the Court in Penn 
Central determined that if a regulation does not further a legitimate state 
interest, a compensable taking has probably occurred and an ad hoc 
inquiry may be unnecessary.202  In Penn Central, the Court rested its 
decision on the fact that protecting historical landmarks was a legitimate 
state interest.203  Also, in formulating the viability prong of its test, the 
Agins Court cited to Penn Central’s economic impact analysis.204  
Apparently, the Court saw this prong as “closely related” to the 
investment-backed expectations issue and sought to combine these two 
points into its “economically viable use” prong.205  Nevertheless, just 
how the Agins test is meant to comport with the Penn Central analysis 
has created much uncertainty.206  Some argue that the former is a 
 
 196. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133 (1978). 
 197. Id. at 134–35.  198. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 72, at 136.  199. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
 200. Id. at 260.  201. See generally Valparaiso Assocs. v. City of Cotati, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 551 (Ct. App. 1997) (finding that the Agins test should be read in the disjunctive).  But see Del Oro Hills v. City of Oceanside, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 677 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding that both prongs must be satisfied).  202. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 108 (1978). 
 203. Id. at 124. 
 204. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.  205. Alperin, supra note 3, at 184.  206. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 72, at 138. 
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substitute for the latter, even though the Court in Agins neither overruled 
Penn Central nor stated that its test superceded it.207  Still others hold 
that Agins incorporates the elements of Penn Central.208 
Given these conflicting interpretations, it should come as no surprise 
that lower federal and state courts have little clarity as to which test to 
apply.  Even the Supreme Court seems confused.  This is evinced by 
the fact that some of the Court’s regulatory takings cases apply the 
three-factor test of Penn Central, while others rely on the two-factor 
test of Agins.209  More surprisingly, no Supreme Court decision since 
Agins has made any attempt to assimilate or resolve these two 
competing tests.210  This not only has led to confusion in the courts, but 
has bred uncertainty for city planners, communities, and litigants.211  
As a result of this confusion, some state and federal courts attempt to 
formulate their own, often overcomplicated and bizarre, takings 
tests.212  Others have simply abandoned takings claims altogether and 
choose to resolve such cases on alternative constitutional grounds.213  
Nevertheless, as reflected in the majority of cases, the Penn Central 
test has proven the most suitable and effective.214  More importantly, its 
case-sensitive analysis affords litigants many additional arguments as to 
why they should be compensated for a regulatory taking.  Many of these 
pleas would be foreclosed under other tests.215  Indeed, as one 
commentator has put it, “The Supreme Court could do all affected 
groups a service by jettisoning the Agins and other regulatory takings 
criteria in favor of Penn Central’s regulatory takings trilogy.”216  This 
is exactly what the trend appears to be,217 and is exactly what the 
 
 207. Id. (citing J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory 
Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 104 (1995); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings 
Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles, Part I—A Critique of Current Takings 
Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1330–33 (1989)). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 138–39. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. (citing Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (using a test consisting of eight parts)). 
 213. Id. (citing Guimont v. Clarke, 854 P.2d 1, 19 (Wash. 1993) (using substantive due process principles in resolving the case)). 
 214. Id. at 139.  215. Examples of these tests include those based on an eminent domain claim, a categorical per se rule, or other due process analyses.  216. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 72, at 139. 
 217. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 607 (2001) (applying the 
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Supreme Court is encouraging claimants in regulatory takings cases to 
do.218 
III.  APPLICATION 
A.  The Temporary Moratoria and the Seeds of Controversy 
Assuming that in theory the Penn Central three-pronged test is the 
most comprehensive and effective takings analysis, that theory must now 
be tested.  In the area of regulatory takings law, there is no hotter issue 
than that of the temporary development moratoria.219  Thus, there is no 
better area to test the effectiveness of the Penn Central analysis in 
resolving such issues.  Since the 1970s, considerable state regulation has 
been focused on preserving environmentally sensitive land.220  The 
regulatory vehicle of choice to protect such land has been the 
development moratorium.  Such a moratorium acts as an authorized 
delay in the provision of governmental services or developmental 
approval221 and often results in a state imposed development ban.222  The 
Supreme Court held in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. 
County of Los Angeles223 that such a government land use restriction, 
although temporary, may require compensation under a regulatory 
takings analysis.  In First English, the Court held that if such a 
temporary ban is amply harsh, it constitutes a compensable taking “not 
different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution 
 
three-prong test of Penn Central).  218. For a discussion of the Court’s favoring the Penn Central analysis and how it encourages claimants to use it, see infra Part III.E.  219. At this point, it is important to reiterate that the Takings Clause comes into play in two procedurally different ways.  As mentioned above, the first of these is the condemnation proceeding.  Under these circumstances, the government admits that it has taken private property by exercising its sovereignty by way of eminent domain.  In condemnation cases, the government functions as the plaintiff in a suit against the property or its owner.  Condemnation involves cases where there is little or no doubt that a taking has occurred—for example, when the government takes property in order to build a public highway.  In such cases the only real issue is how much compensation is just.  On the other hand, takings cases involving regulatory measures such as the temporary moratoria are of a different and more recent type.  In regulatory takings cases, the government intrudes on private property interests but categorically denies that a taking has occurred.  In these cases, it is the property owner who must function as a plaintiff and proactively seek compensation for what the government denies is an act of eminent domain.  Regulatory takings cases most often involve some type of restriction on a property owner’s use of her property.  The temporary moratoria is such a restriction.  MELTZ ET AL., supra note 72, at 3–4.  220. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND LAND-USE REGULATION 205 (1997).  221. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 72, at 266. 
 222. Id. (citing Joint Ventures Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990)).  223. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
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clearly requires compensation.”224  However, in keeping with its vague 
holdings in the regulatory takings area, the Court has not sufficiently 
defined when a temporary moratorium becomes compensable.225 
Courts have held that under the authority of a state’s police power, 
local governments may enact reasonable moratoria in order to edge 
development for short periods without causing a compensable taking.  
However, these regulations must be enacted in keeping with the 
requirements of legitimacy and proportionality.226  Short-term moratoria 
are more defensible because developers and owners are able to plan 
around such obstacles.  Also, the economic impact will be slight because 
viability will rebound when the moratorium expires.227  Absent some 
sort of extraordinary delay or fluctuation in value occurring during the 
life of the temporary moratorium, such obstacles are considered by the 
courts as incidents of ownership.228  This should require that the 
government set well-defined and reasonable durations for such moratoria 
and that government agencies respect these durations for each 
moratorium enacted. 
A type of moratorium that is particularly defensible is a well-defined 
“planning pause” moratorium.229  This gives the government breathing 
room to consider a comprehensive zoning plan and to react to such 
problems as explosive development or the loss of a natural resource.230  
Cases involving this type of moratorium are particularly well suited for 
the fact-sensitive Penn Central takings analysis.231  Nevertheless, courts 
should support such moratoria only when there is a legitimate public 
need and when the moratoria are no longer than necessary, when there is 
an economically viable use for the land both during and after the 
moratorium, when the moratorium does no substantial harm to the 
landowner’s reasonable investment-backed expectation, and if the 
character of the government regulation adds proportionality to the list of 
 
 224. Id. at 318.  225. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 72, at 267. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 268–69. 
 228. Id. at 271. 
 229. Id. at 272.  230. 119 Dev. Assocs. v. Vill. of Irvington, 566 N.Y.S.2d 954, 955 (App. Div. 1991).  231. Schulz v. Lake George Park Comm’n, 579 N.Y.S.2d 761, 763 (App. Div. 1992) (holding that “while the use of emergency rules imposing construction moratoriums is likely to recur, whether such moratoriums are justified is a fact-sensitive inquiry to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis”). 
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the moratorium’s defensible characteristics.232  Ultimately, defensible 
moratoria are the rule rather than the exception.233 
B.  California: A “Fertile Ground for Sprouting                                          
Land Use Controversies”234 
The implementation of particularly troublesome temporary development 
moratoria provided the spark for a landmark takings case involving     
the environmentally sensitive Lake Tahoe Basin area.235  Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency236 involved 
two moratoria totaling thirty-two months on development while the 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) formulated a comprehensive 
and environmentally sensitive plan in order to protect the lake from the 
development induced runoff that was destroying its clarity.237  Hundreds 
of owners who had individually purchased subdivided, single family 
residential lots around Lake Tahoe claimed that, for two decades, the 
TRPA had prevented them from building their homes.238  They claimed 
that this had been accomplished by a series of unconstitutional “rolling 
prohibitions” that had halted development since 1981.239  Most of these 
landowners, who bought their lots years before the challenged 
regulations had even been considered, were married couples who 
invested in anticipation of retirement and family vacations or with the 
expectation of building permanent residences and not as part of a profit-
driven real estate speculation scheme.240 
The battle between those who seek to develop their property and those 
 
 232. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 72, at 272. 
 233. Id. at 273.  234. DENNIS J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: SHAPING SOCIETY THROUGH LAND USE REGULATION 112 (1993).  235. Lake Tahoe is an exceptionally pure and beautiful natural resource, the crown jewel of the Sierra Nevada mountain range.  It is the largest alpine lake in the world based on all its dimensions, including a remarkable average depth of 1,027 feet and a maximum depth of 1,645 feet.  At 6,229 feet above sea level the Lake stretches over 192 square miles, ringed by snow-capped peaks that soar thousands of feet higher.  It contains enough water to flood the State of California to a depth of 14 inches. Brief for Respondents at 4, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (No. 00-1167)  (citing Carl R. Pagter & Cameron W. Wolfe, Jr., Lake Tahoe: The Future of a National Asset, 52 CAL. L. REV. 563, 564 (1964)).  236. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 237. Id. at 306.  238. Brief for Petitioners at 2, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. 302 (No. 00-1167). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id.; see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 312–13 (noting that the primary purpose of the proposed construction was for permanent, retirement, or vacation residences). 
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who wish to preserve the area in its pristine natural condition has had an 
intensity and duration unmatched in the land use arena.  In order to fully 
appreciate why this war has been fought with such tenacity on both 
sides, some background into the judicial tenor of takings law in 
California and the natural history of Lake Tahoe is necessary. 
One commentator has remarked that “[t]he California soil has proved 
fertile ground for sprouting land use controversies.”241  Due to its perfect 
climate, natural beauty, top universities, and stable economy, California 
almost always tops the list of fastest growing residential and commercial 
communities.242  Great growth pressures, coupled with opposition from 
current and long-time residents who seek to preserve their “place in the 
sun,” have resulted in many regulatory proceedings that are often 
“packed with pressure and intrigue.”243  Due to the state’s sympathetic 
laws and judges, land use regulations in California have been wielded as 
an effective tool for preserving the status quo.  In fact, the California 
Supreme Court has been heralded as being tougher on the property rights 
of developers than any other tribunal in the nation.244 
For example, in 1979, the court set the tone for many years to come by 
holding that the compensation provisions found in both the state and the 
Federal Constitution did not apply to regulatory takings.245  In Agins v. 
City of Tiburon,246 discussed above, the property owner purchased five 
acres in the city of Tiburon with the intent of developing housing that 
would overlook the city of San Francisco.247  Subsequently, the property 
was allocated for open space by the city and thereafter rezoned to allow the 
construction of one to five houses on the land,  contingent upon additional 
regulatory approvals.248  The city initiated eminent domain procedures to 
purchase the land from the Aginses, but later abandoned the effort.249  The 
Aginses claimed that the city was effecting a regulatory taking for which 
compensation was due under both the state and federal Constitution.250 
 
 241. COYLE, supra note 234, at 112. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id.  244. 1 NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW: LAND USE AND THE POLICE POWER § 6.03, at 184 (rev. 1988).  245. COYLE, supra note 234, at 115.  Note also that the Supreme Court did not repudiate this holding by another decision until 1987.  Id.  246. 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
 247. Id. at 26. 
 248. Id. at 27. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 28. 
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In a bold move, the California Supreme Court held that the Aginses 
did not have the ability to sue for compensation.  The court found that 
“[c]ommunity planners must be permitted the flexibility that their work 
requires”251 and that any chance of compensation as a result of their 
actions would “chill” necessary regulation.252  Also, because the court 
held that compensation was not the proper remedy, the Aginses had no 
cause of action.253  The only remedy for a regulatory taking, according to 
the court, was invalidation of the ordinance,254 which would provide 
little more than a Pyrrhic victory for the Aginses and other landowners.  
In many ways, the California Supreme Court was providing for a reverse 
per se rule by holding that regulatory takings can never be compensable.  
Like arguing for a per se rule mandating compensation, such a rule 
forecloses the fairness analysis so critical to the Penn Central test and 
often leads to injustice. 
Echoing this view, Justice Clark in dissent claimed that the holding 
would force developers to abandon their properties: “Today’s decision 
effectively pronounces that henceforth in California title to real property 
will no longer be held in fee simple but rather in trust for whatever 
purposes and uses a governmental agency exercising legislative power 
elects, without compensation.”255  While Clark’s claim may have seemed 
a bit extreme, it accurately characterizes the judicial climate towards 
private property owners in California.  During the 1980s, private landowners 
won only twenty-one percent of the constitutional cases heard by the 
California Supreme Court and lost all but one of the thirteen cases that 
involved regulatory limits on property rights to use and develop land.256 
Not surprisingly, neither the California Supreme Court nor the U.S. 
Supreme Court made any mention of such fairness factors as security or 
proportionality in their respective resolutions of the takings issue in 
Agins.  As noted above, that case developed an alternative test based on 
furthering legitimate state interests and deprivation of economic value.257  
It could be argued that a strong fairness concern arose when the Aginses 
were forced to submit to an ordinance not in effect when they purchased 
their land.  In order to vindicate the legitimate hopes of those who 
expend their limited monetary resources on land, at the very least 
investment-backed expectations should have been a consideration before 
these two tribunals.  That these basic fairness considerations were 
 
 251. Id. at 30. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 28. 
 254. Id. at 30. 
 255. Id. at 34 (Clark, J., dissenting).  256. COYLE, supra note 234, at 117.  257. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
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ignored further reflects the California court’s antilandowner sentiments 
and how evolution beyond the Penn Central test may lead to injustice 
for landowners everywhere. 
C.  A “Short” Natural History of Lake Tahoe and the                             
Tahoe-Sierra Controversy 
Nearly 500 million years ago, during the Paleozoic era, the Sierra 
Nevada Mountains laid deep beneath the sea.258  Over a period of at least 
270 million years, through continental drifting, incredible pressure, and 
erosion, the Tahoe Basin was formed.259  During a 10,000 year period of 
glaciation, valleys were cut and then filled by ice dams that released 
walls of water and immense boulders downstream, forming what we 
know today as Lake Tahoe.260  This majestic national history marked 
just the beginning of this singularly pristine and yet rugged area.  Lake 
Tahoe’s stunning beauty has and continues to impress politicians, 
naturalists, and famous writers alike.261  The great American writer Mark 
Twain, although celebrated for his ability to spin tall tales, gave a 
universally accepted and accurate account of its beauty: 
[A] noble sheet of blue water lifted six thousand three hundred feet above the level of the sea, and walled in by a rim of snow-clad mountain peaks that towered aloft full three thousand feet higher still! . . . As it lay there with the shadows of the mountains brilliantly photographed upon its still surface I thought it must surely be the fairest picture the whole earth affords.262 
Countless others have voiced similar descriptions regarding Lake 
Tahoe’s splendor and its place as a natural treasure.  Former President 
Bill Clinton referred to Lake Tahoe as “one of the crown jewels, unique 
among them all,” and as a “national treasure that must be protected and 
preserved.”263  Indeed, according to one senate report, “[o]nly two other 
sizable lakes in the world are of comparable quality—Crater Lake in 
Oregon, which is protected as part of the Crater Lake National Park, and 
 
 258. California Environmental Resources Evaluation System, Geology and Natural 
History of Lake Tahoe, at http://ceres.ca.gov/tcsf/tahoe-local/geology.html (last updated June 10, 1997). 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id.  261. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1230 (D. Nev. 1999), rev’d, 228 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000), and aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).  262. MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 169 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1872).  263. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 34 F. Supp. at 1230–31. 
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Lake Baikal in the [former] Soviet Union.”264 
A major part of what makes Lake Tahoe so special is the clarity of its 
water.265  Twain vividly described the water’s clarity as “not merely 
transparent, but dazzlingly, brilliantly so.”266  This clarity is due to the 
lack of algae that tends to obscure the waters of most other lakes.267  
This pristine beauty, combined with the fact that Lake Tahoe is so 
readily accessible from large metropolitan centers and so adaptable to 
urban growth,268 has resulted in a marked increase in land development 
and a concomitant dramatic decrease in the clarity of its waters.269  This 
decrease is attributed to runoff over impervious coverage from urban 
development that sends nitrogen and phosphorous into the lake, which 
nourishes the growth of algae.270  It is estimated that if the lake loses its 
clarity, along with its “noble sheet of blue water,”271 it could take “over 
700 years for it to return to its natural state, if that were ever possible at 
all.”272  As Justice Stevens stated in Tahoe-Sierra, “The lake’s unsurpassed 
beauty, it seems, is the wellspring of its undoing.”273 
Reflecting Justice Stevens’s sentiments, the TRPA argued that “the 
region’s natural wealth contains the virus of its ultimate impoverishment.”274  
It was these well-warranted concerns, coupled with an effort to maintain 
the status quo, which promoted the development ban that sparked the 
controversy behind the Tahoe-Sierra case.  During the life of the ban, a 
study concerning the impact of development was to be conducted and an 
environmentally sound growth strategy was to be devised.275  In 1969, 
 
 264. S. REP. NO. 91-510, at 4 (1969). 
 265. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.  266. TWAIN, supra note 262, at 175.  267. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 307 (2002).  268. S. REP. NO. 91-510, at 3–4. 
 269. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 (finding the clarity of the water to be decreasing one foot per year). 
 270. Id.  The unusual clarity of Lake Tahoe results from the fact that it, historically, was “oligotrophic,” which means it was very low in nutrients and lacking a steep temperature gradient that would prevent deep circulation and mixing.  Id.  Since mid-century, however, the lake has been undergoing “eutrophication,” a process by which the nutrient loading in the lake increases dramatically due to nitrogen and phosphorous (contained in the soil) being washed down into the lake.  Id.  The excessive enrichment of the lake by these nutrients encourages the growth of algae.  Id.  As algae growth in the lake increases, the lake loses its clarity and color, becoming green and opaque.  Id. 
 271. Id. at 1230 (quoting 1 TWAIN, supra note 262, at 169). 
 272. Id. at 1231.  273. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 307 (2002).  274. Brief for Respondents at 6, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. 302 (No. 00-1167) (quoting People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 487 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Cal. 1971)). 
 275. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S at 306. 
LARKIN.DOC 9/24/2019  4:12 PM 
[VOL. 40:  1597, 2003]  Dramatic Decreases in Clarity 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 1629 
under the concurrence of Congress and the President, California and 
Nevada formed the TRPA in an attempt to unify their land use planning 
goals and to control development in the 501 square mile portion of the 
Lake Tahoe Basin that they shared.276  Early planning efforts divided the 
land into different zones categorized by steepness, geology, and water 
absorption.277  Four of these zones were designated “high hazard” areas 
based on their contribution to the lake’s deteriorating clarity.278  Initially, 
development was restricted in these zones but not prohibited.279 
During the period following the TRPA’s formation, the lake’s clarity 
continued to deteriorate.  Soon after, California and Nevada began to 
disagree on how to best govern the area.  Ultimately, California became 
so frustrated with the TRPA that it ceased to grant financial support and 
independently applied much more stringent regulations to the affected 
area within its borders.280  As a result, Congress and the President amended 
the interstate compact that created the TRPA.  The new Tahoe compact, 
formed in 1980, mandated a well-defined slowdown of development but 
not a halt.281  During this slowdown, the TRPA was to conduct an 
eighteen month study regarding threshold carrying capacities, and then 
another year would be necessary to amend the plan in order to maintain 
those capacities.282  In short, the TRPA was to determine the type and 
amount of development allowable in order to protect the region’s scenic, 
recreational, and natural resources. 
After a few months, the TRPA determined that it could not meet the 
deadlines imposed on it by the compact.283  Therefore, it enacted 
Ordinance 81-5, which imposed the first of two moratoria on development 
that would eventually form the basis of the plaintiffs’ takings claim.  The 
ordinance prohibited the construction of all new residences on “high 
hazard” lands in California.284  It became effective in 1981 and was to 
 
 276. Id. at 309. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id.  281. Though it had statutory power to do more, during the planning period the legislation only imposed a cap on the number of residential permits that could be issued, not an outright ban on development.  The legislation was quite specific in terms of duration and what would be regulated. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. 
Council, 535 U.S. 302 (No. 00-1167). 
 282. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 310. 
 283. Id. at 310–11. 
 284. Id. at 311.  According to a detailed analysis of the ordinance, it may have even 
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remain in effect until the adoption of a permanent plan required by the 
compact.285  Given the complexity of defining environmental threshold 
carrying capacities, the TRPA was not able to adopt such measures until 
1982, two months after the compact deadline, which still afforded the 
TRPA another year to amend and implement the plan.286  Unfortunately, 
no regional plan was in place as of that date.  Thus, the TRPA adopted 
Resolution 83-21, an eight month resolution completely suspending all 
project reviews and approvals, including the acceptance of new 
proposals.287  This ban persisted until 1984, when a new regional plan 
was developed.  These two ordinances sparked the controversies which 
lead to the Tahoe-Sierra case. 
Complicating matters, on the day that the 1984 plan was adopted, the 
State of California filed an action seeking to enjoin implementation of 
the regional plan because it failed, in the State’s view, to establish land 
use controls sufficiently stringent to protect the Lake Tahoe Basin.288  
This injunction was upheld by the court of appeals and remained in 
effect until a revised plan was adopted in 1987.289  Both the 1984 
injunction and the 1987 plan contained provisions prohibiting new 
construction on sensitive lands in the Lake Tahoe Basin.290  This set the 
stage for a protracted litigation that would take over fourteen years 
before the first phase of the trial would begin.291 
D.  The Arguments 
For most courts, the issue of whether a temporary moratorium on 
development amounts to a compensable regulatory taking is a 
“significant constitutional question of first impression.”292  Prior to First 
English v. Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, it 
was fairly well established that temporary planning moratoria were not 
considered takings.293  However, after that case it is unclear whether 
such moratoria without compensation remain legitimate planning 
 
prohibited hiking or picnicking on all high hazard land, but was eventually interpreted as a prohibition on any construction or other activity involving the removal of vegetation or the creation of land coverage on all high hazard lands in California.  Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 312. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Id.  291. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1229 (D. Nev. 1999), rev’d, 228 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000), and aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).  292. Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 95 F.3d 1066, 1073 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 293. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1248. 
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tools.294  In Tahoe-Sierra, the defendants argued that “both Ordinance 
81-5 and 83-21 were ‘reasonable temporary planning moratoria,’ and 
thus not takings.”295  In response, and relying in part on First English, 
the plaintiffs argued that all temporary moratoria on development must 
be regarded as takings per se.296  As a result of arguing a per se rule as 
the basis for asserting their takings claim, the plaintiffs chose not to 
utilize Penn Central’s ad hoc analysis or multifactor test.  Rather, and 
quite possibly to their peril, the plaintiffs chose to argue that the 
moratoria caused a categorical taking in the nature of eminent domain by 
denying them all economically viable use of their land.297 
The plaintiffs’ argument relied on Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council,298 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court held that any regulation that 
completely eliminates the economically beneficial use of property 
amounts to a compensable taking per se.299  As a consequence of relying on such a categorical rule, plaintiffs in regulatory takings cases deprive 
themselves of the fact-sensitive inquiry critical to a Penn Central 
analysis.  While such an approach may at first blush appear stable, clear, 
and more efficient than the Penn Central test, in reality it is a nearly 
impossible case for plaintiffs to make.  Thus, the plaintiffs in Tahoe-
Sierra chose to fight an “uphill battle” by trying to fit their case into the 
“relatively rare” situation in which a regulation denies all productive use 
of an entire parcel.300  This hill was made “particularly steep” by the 
very nature of such a categorical rule, which would require compensation, 
regardless of the governmental purpose, every time such a moratorium 
on development was to be imposed.301 
Conversely, the plaintiffs may have had a method to their madness in 
arguing for a categorical taking under Lucas.  Like the plaintiffs in Penn 
Central, the Tahoe-Sierra plaintiffs did not challenge the legitimacy of 
the state interest being furthered by the regulations.302  The plaintiffs 
 
 294. Id. at 1249. 
 295. Id. at 1248. 
 296. Id.  297. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 317–18 (2002).  298. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 299. Id. at 1029. 
 300. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 319–20 (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987)). 
 301. Id. at 320.  302. Brief for Petitioners at 3, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. 302 (No. 00-1167) (stating that “[t]he problem which has brought this case here is not the regulatory 
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agreed that Lake Tahoe was a beautiful national treasure worth 
preserving.  The plaintiffs stressed that the case was about means, not 
ends.303  What was at issue, they argued, was not whether the TRPA had 
a legitimate state interest in protecting the glory of Lake Tahoe by 
banning development, but whether it could do so without compensation.  
As in Penn Central, the landowners sought compensation, not 
invalidation of the protections.304  Given this concession, the plaintiffs 
may have feared that their remaining viability, security, and 
proportionality arguments would be significantly weakened with a 
concomitant strengthening of the state’s case against them.  The Tahoe-
Sierra plaintiffs may have been wary of meeting the same fate as those 
in Penn Central and thus sought, by arguing a completely different 
theory, to save their case from the doom of precedent.  Under the Lucas 
test, which seeks to draw a direct analogy between regulatory takings 
and eminent domain, takings may be found compensable without an 
inquiry into the legitimacy of the state’s interest.305  Thus, by resting 
their claim on Lucas, the Tahoe-Sierra plaintiffs did not need to risk 
either weakening their own position or bringing themselves within the 
four corners of Penn Central by conceding the TRPA’s legitimate state 
purpose. 
Furthermore, as the Court pointed out, under the Lucas analysis and a 
per se rule, there is no need to evaluate either the landowners’ investment-
backed expectations or the reasonableness of such reliance expenditures.306  
Suggesting that this may have been a critical point, the district court 
pointed out that it was common knowledge in the Lake Tahoe Basin at 
the time of purchase that a “crackdown on development was in the 
works.”307  Such “common knowledge” may have served as constructive 
notice under the holding in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, thereby crippling 
the plaintiff’s investment-backed expectations claim.  Thus, by arguing 
for a per se rule, the plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierra saved themselves from 
having their investment-backed expectations held unreasonable, which 
 
ends, but rather the unconstitutional means employed by TRPA”) (emphasis added). 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. at 2.  305. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1006–07, 1015 (1992) (stating that “[t]his case requires us to decide whether the Act’s dramatic effect on the economic 
value of Lucas’s lots accomplished a taking . . . requiring the payment of just compensation” (emphasis added)); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434–35 (1982) (stating that in cases based on eminent domain, a property owner is entitled to compensation regardless of the various state interests involved and regardless of the severity of the economic impact). 
 306. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S at 539.  307. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1241 (D. Nev. 1999), rev’d, 228 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000), and aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
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would have significantly weakened their otherwise effective and 
necessary fairness argument. 
Initially, given the strength of the unchallenged governmental interest 
and the apparent weakness of the plaintiffs’ security arguments, not 
relying on the Penn Central factors may have seemed like a legal necessity.  
Indeed, the district court held that under a Penn Central analysis, the 
plaintiffs’ takings claim would have failed.308  In addition to finding that 
the plaintiffs did not have reasonable investment-backed expectations, 
the court found it critical that the nature of the governmental action was 
temporary and that the plaintiffs failed to offer specific evidence of 
economic harm.  However, under the Lucas per se analysis, the district 
court found that the plaintiffs had been temporarily deprived of all 
economically viable use of their land, thus effecting a per se taking 
requiring compensation.309 
Nevertheless, on appeal, the TRPA successfully challenged the district 
court’s holding by arguing that because the regulations had only a 
temporary impact on the plaintiffs’ fee interest, no categorical taking had 
occurred.  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that a regulation affecting only a 
portion of the parcel, whether limited by time, use, or space, does not 
deprive the owner of all economically beneficial use of his or her land.310  
Decisively, the plaintiffs did not bother to challenge the district court’s 
possible misapplication of the Penn Central analysis in their appellate 
argument.  This omission lead the Ninth Circuit to limit its analysis to 
the per se approach under Lucas.311  This, coupled with the fact that the 
plaintiffs did not challenge the legitimacy of the state’s interest, may 
have lead to their downfall.312 
E.  What Might Have Been: Arguing the Penn Central Analysis 
Following the Ninth Circuit’s lead, Justice Stevens did not perform the 
Penn Central analysis in his majority opinion.313  Rather, the Court 
 
 308. Id. at 1240. 
 309. Id. at 1245.  310. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 776–77 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 311. Id. at 773. 
 312. Id.  313. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 334 (2002) (holding that “[r]ecovery under a Penn Central analysis is . . . foreclosed both because petitioners expressly disavowed that theory, and because they did not appeal from the District Court’s conclusion that the evidence would not support it”). 
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chose to deny the application of a per se rule because such a categorical 
mandate would render inoperable a necessary and proper exercise of 
police power.314  Such a rule, the Court held, would interfere with “normal 
delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, 
variances, and the like”315 and, in an extreme case, compensation may be 
required due to orders “temporarily prohibiting access to crime scenes, 
businesses that violate health codes, fire-damaged buildings, or other 
areas that [the Court could not then] foresee.”316  This reference to 
unforeseeable consequences underscores the Court’s desire to maintain 
control over what may or may not amount to a compensable taking in 
order to safeguard the state’s exercise of legitimate police power.  The 
categorical rule from Lucas does not afford the Court this flexibility.  
However, the Penn Central analysis provides a fact-sensitive and 
flexible balancing approach.  As stated in Pennsylvania Coal and cited 
by Justice Stevens in Tahoe-Sierra, “[g]overnment hardly could go on if 
to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished 
without paying for every such change in the general law.”317 
Despite the fact that the Court ruled against the plaintiffs based on its 
Lucas analysis, the Court hinted several times that under a flexible Penn 
Central approach, the outcome may have been different.  In the Court’s 
view, “the answer to the abstract question whether a temporary 
moratorium effects a taking is neither ‘yes, always’ nor ‘no, never’; the 
answer depends upon the particular circumstances of the case.”318  This 
reference to the necessity of a fact-sensitive analysis is the first 
indication that the Court expected and desired to use the Penn Central 
approach.  Indeed, the plaintiffs may have overestimated the strength of 
their position by resting their fate on so bold a claim as a categorical 
taking.  The Court may have been taken aback at such an intrepid move.  
Evidence of this possible affront is reflected throughout the majority 
opinion.  In many subtle ways, Justice Stevens seems to consistently 
bring up the fact that under a Penn Central analysis the plaintiffs may 
have prevailed. 
The Court reaffirmed this position by stating that it must resist “[t]he 
temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction,”319 
thereby concluding that the circumstances of the case were “best 
 
 314. Id. at 335. 
 315. Id. (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)). 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)). 
 318. Id. at 321. 
 319. Id. (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (writing that “[o]ur polestar instead remains the principles set forth in Penn 
Central itself”)). 
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analyzed within the Penn Central framework.”320  In a footnote, Justice 
Stevens took another opportunity to hint that under a Penn Central 
analysis the outcome may have been different.321  In response to the 
dissent’s accusation that the majority had allowed the government to 
“take private property without paying for it,”322 Justice Stevens pointed 
out that the Court had not said that a temporary moratorium could never 
effect a compensable taking.323  Rather, he stated quite plainly the 
possibility that “under a Penn Central analysis petitioners’ land was 
taken and compensation would be due.”324  Justice Stevens quoted Penn 
Central and other cases in order to categorize the Court’s regulatory 
takings jurisprudence as “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries”325 that are 
designed to afford “careful examination and weighing of all the relevant 
circumstances.”326 
Ultimately, the Court categorized the Tahoe-Sierra case in Penn 
Central terms when it stated that the controversy had arisen from “some 
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to 
promote the common good.”327  The Court even framed the issue by 
referring to Penn Central when it stated “the ultimate constitutional 
question is whether the concepts of ‘fairness and justice’ that underlie 
the Takings Clause will be better served by one of these categorical rules 
or by a Penn Central inquiry into all of the relevant circumstances in 
particular cases.”328  The Court answered that issue immediately by 
stating, “From that perspective, the extreme categorical rule that any 
deprivation of all economic use, no matter how brief, constitutes a 
compensable taking surely cannot be sustained.”329  This finding 
implicitly suggests that the converse may also be true: that under a Penn 
Central analysis, which eschews extreme categorical rules, such a claim 
could be sustained. 
 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at 321 n.16 (“It may be true that under a Penn Central analysis petitioners’ land was taken and compensation would be due.”). 
 322. Id. (quoting id. at 349) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. (emphasis added).  325. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).  326. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 327. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 324–35 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124). 
 328. Id. at 334. 
 329. Id. 
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F.  Unfinished Business: Applying the Penn Central Test                              
in Tahoe-Sierra 
Unfortunately, it is too late for the plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierra.  They 
cannot now make the arguments that may have swayed the Court.  Of 
course, the fact that the Court would not conduct a Penn Central 
analysis sua sponte as the district court had done suggests that the Court 
may have been predisposed to finding that no compensable taking had 
occurred in the case.  Nevertheless, this section will apply the Penn 
Central analysis to the facts of Tahoe-Sierra and attempt to determine 
how the outcome may have been different had the plaintiffs not insisted 
on a per se rule.330 
1.  Viability 
One of the benefits of arguing a regulatory takings case under the 
Penn Central analysis is that a plaintiff may force an evaluation of 
economic impact without demanding the use of per se rules.  The 
primary beneficial difference is that under Penn Central, economic 
viability becomes just a single piece of ammunition in an arsenal of 
possible fairness weaponry, instead of the single dispositive issue.  
Ultimately, the economic impact analysis protects a landowner’s interest 
in the continued economic viability of his property by evaluating a 
regulation’s impact on its value.  As suggested, this analysis may be 
broken down into three areas of economic impact.331 
The first area of economic impact is the rate of reasonable return.  The 
key element in this analysis is determining the property owner’s true 
expectancy.  People purchase property for a variety of reasons, which do 
not always include turning a profit through shrewd speculation.  For 
example, some landowners will purchase property upon which to build a 
family dream home for long-term ownership and use, to preserve the 
land for public enjoyment, or to keep a particular parcel “in the family” 
with no thought of speculation or profit.  On the other hand, property 
may be used to make a profit in a variety of ways.  For instance, some 
may wish to operate a business on the land for many years or to build 
space for lease or rent.  Of course, under certain circumstances, a 
property owner’s true expectancy will be to immediately resell the 
property at a higher rate when the market reaches its peak.  However, 
when profit is the true expectancy, property owners may have a difficult 
time arguing that a temporary ban on development will ultimately 
 
 330. Because the plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierra did not challenge the legitimacy of the state purpose, that ad hoc factor will not be applied in this analysis. 
 331. See supra Part II.C.2. 
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deprive them of what they seek.  This is because once the ban is lifted, 
the market will rebound and the landowner will realize the expected 
return on her investment.  Any downturn in the market due to the 
development ban will most likely be viewed as incidental to this type of 
real estate speculation. 
The plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierra did not intend to turn their land for a 
profit.  If they had, the realization of their true expectancy would have 
merely been delayed by the ban.  Rather, many of them had purchased 
the property in order to build family homes immediately and for long-
term use.332  Given these goals, the plaintiffs could have argued that their 
true expectancy was the ability to build not only a residence, but a better 
life for themselves and their families.  Without compensation for their 
loss, that goal would be permanently frustrated and not just temporarily 
delayed.  Under such circumstances, delaying their compensation becomes 
a human issue, which not only demands a closer look at the mechanical 
aspects of the takings question, but also puts a face on the moratoria’s 
impact.  By conducting a fact-sensitive analysis, Penn Central appears to 
require the Court to identify a particular plaintiff’s true expectancy and 
determine whether an inability to realize it would require the plaintiff to 
be compensated accordingly.333 
Of course, the Court could have found that the Tahoe-Sierra plaintiffs 
were not deprived of their rate of reasonable return.  Despite the 
preservation ordinance, the Penn Central plaintiffs were still able to 
realize what the Court considered to be their true expectancy, which was 
the use of the terminal for their primary business purposes.334  The Court 
in Tahoe-Sierra used a similar interpretation when it stated that “a fee 
simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on 
economic use, because the property will recover value as soon as the 
prohibition is lifted.”335  Nevertheless, this once again implies that the 
plaintiffs’ true expectancy was the ability to maximize profits, which 
would arguably rebound once the moratoria ended.  The plaintiffs in 
Tahoe-Sierra could distinguish Penn Central on the basis that in Penn 
Central, the terminal owners were allowed to realize a reasonable rate of 
 
 332. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 312–13. 
 333. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978) (holding that because the plaintiffs were able to continue using the terminal as they had always done, the degree of interference was not severe enough to support compensation). 
 334. Id. 
 335. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 332. 
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return on their true expectancy without delay because their other 
business ventures were never regulated.  In Tahoe-Sierra, the plaintiffs 
were not able to realize the expected rebound in economic value until the 
ban was lifted, thereby depriving them in the present of their true 
expectancy.  This is true no matter what their true expectancy may have 
been: the speculative sale value of the land, the immediate development 
potential, or the prospect of present sale and building elsewhere.  Under 
any of these expectancies, the Tahoe-Sierra plaintiffs would have been 
denied a reasonable rate of return.  For this they should have been 
compensated accordingly.336 
The next area of impact is the regulation’s effect on possible economic 
uses of the property.  By denying recovery under a per se rule, the Court 
in Tahoe-Sierra foreclosed the argument that all economically viable use 
of the property had been denied by the moratoria.  If all such use had 
been denied, the case could have conceivably succeeded under Lucas.  
The Tahoe-Sierra Court relied on Justice Brennan’s “indivisible 
property”337 theory from Penn Central to hold that in order for a 
temporary ban to be considered a categorical taking, the ban must be 
analyzed in terms of its effect on the property as a whole.338  If the 
property value would have rebounded once the ban was lifted, then all 
viable economic use could not have been denied.  The Court refused to 
divide the plaintiffs’ property into segments of time under the plaintiffs’ 
“conceptual severance” theory.339  The Court even held that First English 
was not on point because, unlike Tahoe-Sierra, First English entertained a 
purely remedial issue and not whether a compensable taking had ever 
occurred.340  Indeed, the Court pointed out that if the plaintiffs wanted to 
succeed under Lucas, the starting point for their analysis was to 
determine whether a categorical taking had occurred within the 
framework of that case’s “total taking” criteria.341  However, under the 
indivisible property theory, the plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierra could not show 
that a total taking had occurred.  Under such circumstances, the Court 
suggested that it would be necessary to determine if a deprivation less 
 
 336. The plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierra could also have distinguished Penn Central on other grounds.  For example, they could have argued that the Penn Central plaintiffs had transferable development rights that allowed them to build elsewhere.  They could have argued that this provided them with an alternative method of realizing their true expectancy.  The Tahoe-Sierra plaintiffs had no such alternative means of reaching their true expectancy. 
 337. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 130–31. 
 338. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 326–27. 
 339. Id. at 331. 
 340. Id. at 328. 
 341. Id. at 330–31. 
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than a total taking had transpired, which may also require compensation.342 
Thus, once again, the Tahoe-Sierra Court demonstrated its preference 
for a Penn Central analysis.  Under Penn Central, it is agreed that when 
all economic use is denied, a compensable taking has occurred.343  From 
this idea flows the concept that no taking has occurred when only the 
most profitable use is restricted.344  In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court may have 
focused on what it considered to be the plaintiffs’ most profitable use, 
the ability to sell the property for a gain once the ban was lifted, and 
determined that this use had not been restricted.  To develop the property 
now for uses beyond real estate speculation and sale may have been 
viewed as the most profitable use solely in the plaintiffs’ subjective 
opinions.  Furthermore, the Court has pointed out elsewhere that such 
future profits are far too speculative for it to forecast and thus cannot be 
“taken” through regulation.345  Under this definition, profit speculation 
based on a future sale does not have the trappings of what the Court 
might define as “property.”  Therefore, the plaintiffs could have argued that 
what was restricted by the moratoria, the right to develop now, was the 
only interest in the case recognized by the Court at risk of being taken.  
As such, by restricting the plaintiffs’ only recognized and compensable 
property right, the moratoria were inflicting the type of harsh economic 
impact ripe for compensation under the Penn Central test.  This is so 
even if the regulations did not amount to a “total taking” under Lucas.  
Nevertheless, the right to develop presently is the only recognizable and 
compensable property interest that the plaintiffs held.  Ironically, viewed 
in this way, it is arguable that a total taking may have occurred, which 
would have entitled the Tahoe-Sierra plaintiffs to compensation under 
either theory. 
The final area of impact is a regulation’s effect on the fair market 
value of the property.  As stated earlier, the concept of fair market value 
is a more fluid concept than the rate of reasonable return or the impact 
on economic use.346  While a diminution in property value standing alone 
cannot establish a compensable taking per se,347 it may when combined 
 
 342. See id. at 330 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8 (1992)). 
 343. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978) (stating that if circumstances were to change such that the terminal ceased to be “economically viable,” the plaintiffs would be able to obtain the compensation sought).  344. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). 
 345. Id.  346. MELTZ ET AL., supra note 72, at 133. 
 347. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S at 131. 
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with the other areas of economic impact as analyzed under Penn 
Central.  It is true that mere fluctuations in value during the process of 
governmental decisionmaking have been held “incidents of ownership” 
and considered insufficient to support a compensable takings claim.348  However, a regulation that destroys nearly the entire fair market value 
during the life of the moratorium, thereby affecting an owner’s ability to 
successfully alienate the land, should be considered a compensable 
taking.  If the ban in Tahoe-Sierra had not all but destroyed the fair market 
value of the plaintiffs’ land, then they could have conceivably sold their 
property in Lake Tahoe and pursued the development of their residences 
elsewhere.  While inconvenient, this may not have amounted to a 
compensable taking because the plaintiffs’ true expectancy would have 
been preserved.  However, after institution of the ban, the only offers to 
purchase the plaintiffs’ regulated property came from the U.S. Forest 
Service at prices amounting to a mere fraction of the value prior to the 
ban.349  Such low offers most likely would not have allowed the 
plaintiffs to effectively relocate.  These decreases in fair market value 
represent more than “mere fluctuations” in price.  They are indicative of 
the type of harsh economic impact envisioned as compensable under the 
Penn Central test. 
In support of its holding that no compensable taking had occurred, the 
Court in Tahoe-Sierra found that not only would property values stay 
constant, but that they would in fact increase during the life of the 
moratoria because of the added assurance that the Basin would “remain 
in its pristine state.”350  However, the plaintiffs could have challenged 
the relevance of this statement on several fronts.  First, the Court did not 
focus itself on the plaintiffs’ true expectancy, which was their ability to 
develop the property for domestic use and not to sell it for a profit once 
the ban was lifted.  Profit was not their expectancy.  The economic 
impact of the regulation took the plaintiffs’ ability to fulfill their goals of 
settling down in the Lake Tahoe Basin according to their life plan—not 
for success in a speculative real estate venture.  The potential rebound of 
property values some time from now most likely meant nothing to them.  
If this had been a case involving loss of fair market value based on real 
estate speculation, it almost certainly would never have made it out of 
the district court.  In this case, fair market value is relevant only to the 
extent that under the moratoria, the plaintiffs could not sell their property 
for what it was truly worth at a time when it would have allowed them to 
 
 348. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980).  349. David G. Savage, Landowners Dealt a Blow by Justices, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2002, at A1.  350. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 341 (2002). 
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pursue their true expectancy.  This artificial loss of fair market value 
forecloses the plaintiffs’ ability to achieve their lifelong goal of a 
lakefront retirement elsewhere.  Furthermore, it could be argued that 
while property values may be tied to the Lake Tahoe Basin’s pristine 
condition, such condition may only be maintained during the moratoria.  
The fear that the lake’s clarity might further deteriorate once the ban is 
lifted, and as a result the institution of another ban affecting potential 
future developers, should keep the property value artificially low even 
after the ban is lifted.  Indeed, the specter of Ruckelshaus v. Monsonto’s 
constructive notice rule would loom like a dark cloud over any future 
development plans, making any investment-backed expectations 
inevitably unreasonable even after the ban was lifted.351  These factors 
nearly guarantee that the land’s value would remain artificially 
depressed even after the ban.  Such a permanent deprivation of fair 
market value would then require compensation.  In the end, these partial 
deprivation arguments never see the light of day under a Lucas analysis, 
which requires a total taking.  Such partial deprivations may only be 
argued under the Penn Central trilogy. 
2.  Security 
As has been discussed, the protection of a property owner’s reasonable 
investment-backed expectations is a powerful but often misapplied tool 
in the takings analysis.352  As such, the Court in Tahoe-Sierra specifically 
mentioned and analyzed the prospect of arguing reasonable investment-
backed expectations as a theory of compensation under the Penn Central 
test.353  It had been proposed that a temporary ban of longer than one 
year without compensation should be viewed with particular constitutional 
skepticism.354  In response, the Court found that bans lasting longer than 
one year may require compensation based on the interference with 
reasonable investment-backed expectations, but that the plaintiffs’ per se 
rule was “too blunt an instrument” to identify such cases.355  What the 
Court may be implying is that finding fairness and justice in any given 
 
 351. For a discussion of Ruckelshaus and the constructive notice rule, see supra Part II.C.3.  352. For a discussion of investment-backed expectations as a factor in the takings analysis, see id. 
 353. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 341–42. 
 354. See id. at 341. 
 355. Id. at 342 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001)). 
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case often requires the precision of a judicial scalpel which can best be 
provided by a flexible Penn Central analysis rather than the net cast by a 
categorical rule.356 
By arguing the need to protect reasonable investment-backed 
expectations under the Penn Central analysis, the plaintiffs could have 
invited the Court to focus more on fairness and less on the cold economic 
impact of the moratoria.  In keeping with Professor Michelman’s test, 
the Court could have looked beyond the “how much” and concentrated 
instead on “whether or not” the plaintiffs’ reasonable investment-backed 
expectations had been adversely affected.357  By conducting a Penn 
Central analysis, the plaintiffs could have argued that fairness, and not 
merely economic impact, is at the heart of the takings problem.358  
Whereas Justice Brennan seemed to sidestep the fairness argument in 
Penn Central,359 the Tahoe-Sierra Court could have been invited to 
succeed where Justice Brennan had failed by clarifying the role of 
investment-backed expectations in the takings analysis.  By labeling the 
issues in Tahoe-Sierra as revolving around “fairness and justice,”360 the 
Court may have been inviting future claimants to provide them with the 
tools of precision necessary to vindicate those elusive concepts.  Such 
tools are not provided by a per se rule. 
Once again, this analysis boils down to identifying what the plaintiffs’ 
true expectancy was.  If their true expectancy had been to realize a profit 
based on real estate speculation, then the security element of the Penn 
Central analysis may have lost much of its force as a fairness tool.  As 
Professor Michelman dictated, such “speculation” is not entitled to 
recognition while crystallized “investments” require compensation.361  
What Professor Michelman may have meant by this distinction is that 
fairness boils down to protecting investments in something more than 
the mere realization of future profit.  Rather, in the regulatory takings 
analysis, fairness means respecting the security that people are entitled 
to have in areas of life that go far beyond mere monetary concerns.  In 
Tahoe-Sierra, many of the plaintiffs were retirees who had invested their 
life savings in land with hopes of fulfilling a lifelong goal of spending 
their hard earned golden years in a lakefront cottage.362  Others were 
those who sought to build permanent homes or to have the property 
 
 356. See id.  357. Michelman, supra note 110, at 1233. 
 358. See Lang, supra note 115, at 49–50. 
 359. Id. at 50. 
 360. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 334.  361. Radford & Breemer, supra note 109, at 456 n.43 (citing Michelman, supra note 110, at 1233–34).  362. Brief for Petitioners at 2, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. 302 (No. 00-1167). 
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available for family vacations.363  Their goals were not to simply turn 
their land for a profit soon after acquisition.  The need to respect these 
nonmonetary and very human goals is so powerful that the Penn Central 
Court suggested that their vindication could even require compensation 
in the face of a legitimate state interest.364  Given that the plaintiffs in 
Tahoe-Sierra conceded the legitimacy of the state interest in their case, 
this fairness factor becomes an even more critical counterweight.  In 
fact, it may have been the key to securing compensation.  In order to 
make the distinction between “speculation” and crystallized “investments” 
urged by Professor Michelman, the Court must be allowed to conduct a 
detailed inquiry into the facts of each case.  However, such an analysis is 
not afforded under a per se test. 
Of course, the defendants in the Tahoe-Sierra case could have called 
into question the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ investment-backed 
expectations.  They could have argued, as the district court did, that the 
plaintiffs were under constructive notice of an imminent environmental 
crackdown in the Lake Tahoe area.365  Had the property in question been 
purchased as a speculative real estate venture based on maximizing 
profit, such an atmosphere of investment risk may have been crippling to 
the plaintiffs’ security analysis under Penn Central.  However, this 
argument loses much of its weight in light of the plaintiffs’ true 
expectancy, which was to maximize only the intrinsic human value of 
the land.  Maximizing such human goals does not enter the same 
atmosphere of risk as real estate speculation.  This is why the fact-
sensitive fairness analysis afforded under Penn Central becomes so 
critical.  Under a per se rule, only such cold hard facts as the economic 
impact in dollars and cents, or the physical duration of the regulation, are 
taken into account.  Under such a rule, the Court may have felt backed 
into a corner and, by way of a knee-jerk reaction, ruled against the 
takings claim.  To rule otherwise may have established a per se precedent 
effectuating future injustices under different factual circumstances.  As 
Justice Stevens stated in Tahoe-Sierra, the solution cannot be found 
through such categorical rules that do not take into account the facts of each 
 
 363. Id.  364. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).  365. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1240 (D. Nev. 1999), rev’d, 228 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000), and aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
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case.366  In the end, the plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierra deprived themselves of 
the entire security and fairness analysis by insisting on a per se rule. 
3.  Proportionality 
The fairness analysis that flows from providing security to reasonable 
investment-backed expectations naturally carries over to the proportionality 
factor.  The Court’s proportionality analysis in Tahoe-Sierra began as 
Penn Central dictates, by examining the character of the government 
action.  First, the Court distinguished regulatory takings from physical 
occupations and stated, “This case does not present the ‘classi[c] taking’ 
in which the government directly appropriates private property for its 
own use.”367  Certainly, if Tahoe-Sierra would have involved an actual 
physical taking, the case would have required compensation on its 
face.368  Under such circumstances there would be no proportionality of 
benefit and burden between the property owner and the public.  
However, the Court categorized the case as a regulatory taking that, in 
the words of Penn Central, arose from “some public program adjusting 
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common 
good.”369  That the moratoria in Tahoe-Sierra sought to promote a public 
good is critical to the proportionality analysis under Penn Central.  As 
Professor Michelman suggested, property owners will be more willing to 
accept some frustration of their reasonable investment-backed expectations 
if regulations are fair in treating all affected parties equally and as long 
as society will benefit more from the regulation than without it.370 
Wisely, the plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierra did not attempt to rely solely on 
physical takings cases.371  Rather, they relied on the per se rule from 
Lucas in an attempt, by analogy, to have their taking treated as 
categorical.  However, the Court refused to characterize the government 
action in Lucas terms either.  Justice Stevens pointed out that the holding 
in Lucas was limited to the “extraordinary” case where “no productive 
or economically beneficial use of land is permitted.”372  The Court put an 
emphasis on the word “no” in the text of the Lucas opinion and 
reiterated that the categorical rule would not apply if even five percent of 
the property value remained.373  In Tahoe-Sierra, because the property 
 
 366. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 321. 
 367. Id. at 324 (quoting E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522 (1998)) (alteration in original). 
 368. Id. at 321–22. 
 369. Id. at 324–25 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124).  370. Michelman, supra note 110, at 1211–12. 
 371. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 325. 
 372. Id. at 330. 
 373. Id. 
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value of the lots in question would rebound once the ban was lifted, the 
categorical rule from Lucas could not be used.374  Rather, a Penn Central 
partial takings analysis would be required.375 
Once the Court clearly established that the taking in Tahoe-Sierra was 
regulatory and not categorical in nature, Justice Stevens proceeded to 
address the proportionality issue.  In doing so, the Court sought to 
determine whether the interests represented in the case warranted 
protecting individual property owners from bearing public burdens 
“which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”376  Ultimately, the Court found that there was “reciprocity of 
advantage”377 because the moratorium protected “the interests of all 
affected landowners against immediate construction that might be 
inconsistent with the provisions of the plan that is ultimately adopted.”378  
Also, as mentioned above, the Court believed that property values would 
continue to increase during the ban. 379 
However, the tenacity of the Court’s conclusion is once again couched 
in its aversion to a per se rule.  The Court stated that it would not “adopt 
a rule that assumes moratoria always force individuals to bear a special 
burden that should be shared by the public as a whole.”380  By using the 
word “always,” the Court suggested that it would not adopt a per se rule 
holding that temporary moratoria never afford “reciprocity of advantage.”  
Nevertheless, this also suggested that fairness and justice may require a 
different outcome under a Penn Central fact-sensitive analysis. 
Indeed, under a fact-sensitive Penn Central analysis, the Court’s 
“reciprocity of advantage” conclusions may be challenged.  First, the 
plaintiffs could have argued that under the facts of their case, the 
rebound of fair market value once the ban is lifted is not relevant to their 
true expectancy because they did not intend to sell the property at any 
time.  Such “speculation” concerning property value is not likely to be 
recognized by the Court as a compensable property interest.381  Also, the 
development ban imposed on the plaintiffs individually will, by 
externality, benefit those property owners in the Lake Tahoe Basin not 
 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. at 332 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).  377. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 378. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 341. 
 379. Id. 
 380. Id. (emphasis added).  381. For a discussion regarding speculatory expectations, see supra Part II.C.3. 
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under the ban because the lake’s singular beauty will be preserved at the 
plaintiffs’ expense.382  While this benefits landowners lucky enough not 
to have purchased property in a high hazard zone, it has no reciprocal 
benefit for the plaintiffs who did.  They are not able to enjoy the fruits of 
this increase because their regulated land is artificially undervalued due 
to the ban.  This artificial market undervaluation makes the plaintiffs 
unable to sell their land now and move to an area only a few miles away 
in the basin where development might be allowed.  In essence, the ban 
has put a restraint on the plaintiffs’ ability to alienate their fee simple 
which, under a Penn Central analysis, should certainly raise 
constitutional skepticism.  In the end, regardless of the amount of force 
that these or other arguments challenging the proportionality of the 
government action may have had, the issue is never reached under a 
Lucas categorical takings analysis. 
4.  A Possible Outcome 
Given the fact that the Court in Tahoe-Sierra hinted several times that 
under a Penn Central analysis the outcome may have been different,383 it 
is only natural to speculate as to whether the Court meant what it 
implied.  Making the state pay for the development ban on the plaintiffs’ 
property in return for the restored clarity of the lake certainly would not 
be a terrible injustice nor, as the petitioner claimed, cause the sky to 
fall.384  Awarding compensation to the plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierra most 
likely would have been possible if they had not insisted on a per se rule.  
In essence, the Court is voicing, as it has consistently done, its 
displeasure over such categorical guidelines.385  The Court does not like 
to be forced to cast a legal net in making its determinations.  Rather, the 
Justices prefer to use a scalpel and dissect the facts of each controversy,  
which gives them power over both the case at hand and over the 
holding’s future precedential effect.  In the end, the Penn Central analysis 
allows a landowner to make several arguments that are never reached 
under a per se rule.  Given these arguments, and the flexibility the Penn 
Central test would have provided, one could conclude that, had it been 




 382. This type of externality is not only unfair, it is inefficient. 
 383. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. at 334.  384. Reply Brief at 18, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. 302 (No. 00-1167).  385. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Like the once crystal clear waters of Lake Tahoe, in the years since 
Penn Central the courts have experienced a dramatic decrease in clarity 
regarding what should be the proper regulatory takings analysis.  In 
Penn Central, Justice Brennan resurrected the importance of critically 
analyzing land use regulations, an issue that the Supreme Court had 
ignored for over fifty years since Pennsylvania Coal.  While it is true that 
Penn Central does not supply clarity by way of “mathematically precise 
variables” in answering a takings question, it does provide “important 
guideposts that lead to the ultimate determination of whether just 
compensation is required.”386  These guideposts lead us down the path of 
human reality in search of justice and fairness.  By taking the Supreme 
Court’s invitation in Tahoe-Sierra to rely on Penn Central as the 
“polestar”387 in future takings cases, courts may begin to build a more 
uniform and functional body of precedent.  Urgency is necessary because 
until such issues are addressed, regulatory takings law, like the waters of 
Lake Tahoe, will continue to suffer dramatic decreases in clarity. 
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